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This  paper  evaluates  the  extent  of  downward  nominal  and  real  wage  rigidity  for  different  categories  of
workers and firms using the methodology recently developed by the International Wage Flexibility Project
(Dickens and Goette, 2006). The analysis is based on an administrative data set on individual earnings,
covering one-third of employees of the private sector in Belgium  over the period 1990-2002. Our results
show that Belgium is characterised by strong real wage rigidity and very low nominal wage rigidity, consistent
than for blue-collar workers. Real rigidity decreases with age and wage level. Wage rigidity appears to be
lower in firms experiencing downturns. Finally, smaller firms and firms with lower job quit rates appear to
have more rigid wages. Our results are robust to alternative measures of rigidity.
Keywords: wage rigidity, matched employer-employee data
JEL code: J31
Abstract
with the Belgian wage formation system of full indexation. Real rigidity is stronger for white-collar workers
Non-technical summary
Drawing  on  a  rich  matched  employer-employee  data  set  and  applying  a  recently-developed  micro-
econometric method, this paper measures and explains degrees of downward nominal and real wage rigidity
for different categories of workers and firms in Belgium.
Downward wage rigidity has been put forward as a possible source of high and persistent unemployment.
The  explanation  is  that  downward  wage  rigidity  prevents  wage  moderation  when  necessary  and  that
employment  flows  substitute  for  wage  flexibility,  resulting  in  unemployment.  The  macroeconomic
consequences of wage rigidity may go beyond those on job flows and unemployment, as it may also affect
inflation dynamics. It has been argued by the Inflation Persistence Network that wage rigidity can be the
cause of price stickiness implying higher output volatility in response to shocks, and of inflation persistence,
requiring stronger interest  rate changes to affect inflation. The specific nature  of wage rigidity is also of
macroeconomic relevance. When nominal wages are rigid, inflation may "grease" the economy because it
gives scope for a reduction in real wages. On the other hand, the influence of inflation on real wages is
limited or even absent when real wages are rigid.
There is extensive literature measuring wage rigidity with macroeconomic data and a growing volume of
studies using microeconomic data. Macroeconomic estimates of wage rigidity typically take the sensitivity of
average wage changes to unemployment rates or to other demand or supply variables as an indicator of
wage rigidity. Downward wage rigidity is then measured as the resistance against average wage cuts in the
event of  adverse economic shocks. Measures  of downward  wage rigidity based on microeconomic data
typically rest on the idea that one observes fewer wage cuts and more wage freezes than would be likely in
the absence  of rigidity. Taking into account the fact that wage changes  are distributed unevenly across
workers, a microeconomic analysis may reveal wage rigidity where a macroeconomic one will not.
Our  estimates  of  downward  nominal  and  real  rigidity  are  based  on  the  micro-econometric  methodology
developed by the International Wage Flexibility Project. These measures of rigidity attempt to capture the
fraction of workers who would receive a (nominal or real)  wage freeze when they were scheduled for a
(nominal  or  real)  wage  cut,  no  matter  what  the  reason  for  the  wage  cut.  The  procedure  corrects  for
measurement errors and jointly estimates real and nominal rigidity. We apply the methodology to a large
matched employer-employee data set from administrative sources for Belgium over the period 1990-2002,
matching information on individual employees' earnings with information from employers' annual accounts.
Administrative data can be more reliable than survey data because the latter suffer more from measurement
and reporting errors. One drawback of our administrative data is that they measure total earnings - including
bonuses - per working day and not base wage per hour worked, which implies that cyclical variations in
hours per working day - e.g. overtime hours - could bias our wage measure.
This paper first provides measures of downward real and nominal wage rigidities for the entire economy. Our
results show that Belgium is characterised by strong real wage rigidity and very low nominal wage rigidity,5
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which  is  consistent  with  the  Belgian  wage  formation  system  of  full  indexation.  We  contribute  to  the
understanding of wage rigidity by evaluating the degree of downward real and nominal rigidity (DRWR and
DNWR) across several groups of workers defined by occupational status, age and wage level. These sample
splits are relevant in view of the labour market institutions in Belgium during the period under consideration,
with  the  mechanism  of  automatic  indexation  of  nominal  wages,  the  separate  sector-level  collective
bargaining for blue-collar and white-collar workers, and the automatic age-related or tenure-related wage
increases for white-collar workers. Moreover, the splits allow us to shed light on alternative theories of wage
setting which have different implications for the worker categories considered. Fully exploiting the matched
employer-employee data set, we evaluate wage rigidity across company types defined by size and quit rates,
and across firms' economic conditions defined by the growth of value added, profits and employment.
Our evaluation of wage rigidity in Belgium is based both on the predictions of standard economic theories
and  on  specific  wage  formation  institutions  in  Belgium.  First,  real  wage  rigidity  is  higher  for  white-collar
workers than for blue-collar workers. Because white-collar workers are more difficult to replace and harder to
monitor, firms are less inclined to cut their wages. In addition, automatic wage increases are largely absent
for blue-collar workers in Belgium. Second, real rigidity decreases with age. Since the cost of job loss is
higher for older workers, they are less likely to quit or “shirk” (i.e. do less work than agreed), even if their
earnings increases are below their expected bargaining reference point. Furthermore, the automatic tenure-
related  and  age-related  wage  increases  become  less  prominent  with  age.  Third,  DRWR  declines  with
earnings level, except for very low earnings. As income grows, a larger fraction is attributable to extra wage
compensation such as bonuses. Very low earnings show a low degree of real rigidity, possibly because they
correspond to more temporary and precarious jobs, with lower bargaining power for real wage increases.
Fourth, downward real wage rigidity is more prevalent in small firms than in large firms. The latter often apply
a company-level wage agreement with more variable wage components that enhance their flexibility. Fifth,
our results also suggest that firms with low quit rates are characterised by stronger real rigidity. Provided that
firms with low quit rates are those with high turnover costs, they have an incentive to avoid (real) wage cuts
in order to reduce (costly) job quits. Sixth, observed DRWR fluctuates with firms' economic conditions. Real
wage rigidity is lower when the firm faces adverse economic conditions. There are more (real) earnings cuts
when value added growth, employment growth or profits are negative. The effects are even stronger for firms
with low turnover, suggesting that wage cuts may substitute for employment cuts when the firm situation
deteriorates. It should be noted that although the degree of real rigidity declines for firms that have incentives
to cut wages, the absolute level of real rigidity remains high in a cross-country comparison. Nominal rigidity is
essentially absent, except for cases in which it becomes binding, such as very low earnings that are close to
the minimum wage.
The  results  are  in  line  with  the  predictions  of  the  shirking  model,  the  turnover  model  and  the  adverse
selection model applied to job quits. Mixed evidence was found for the insider-outsider theory and the firm-
specific human capital model. Finally, the patterns found in the data contradict the predictions of the contract
theory.
1. Introduction
Evaluating and understanding wage rigidities has led to a rich set of research over the last few decades.
Labour  market  institutions  have  been  singled  out  as  an  important  source  of  sluggish  labour  market
adjustment. In particular, labour market rigidities have been put forward as an important cause of the high
level of unemployment in Europe as compared to the US (e.g. Jackman et al., 1999). One of the arguments
is that labour market rigidities, such as firing costs, firing restrictions, minimum wages, and so on, prevent
wage cuts when necessary. In this case employment flows may be a substitute for wage flexibility. If, in
addition, firing costs are high, new hirings may be discouraged even during expansions as firms anticipate
that their adjustment margin will be low in downturns. Cross-country analyses like those of Jackman et al.
(1999)  suggest  that  countries  with  more  rigid  labour  markets  experience  higher  unemployment  rates.
Recently, the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) has coordinated the estimation of wage rigidities
across  a  large  number  of  countries,  based  on  extensive  databases  on  individual  wages.  The  results
presented in Dickens et al. (2006) suggest that unionisation and collective bargaining coverage are positively
related to real wage rigidity, and that differences in the degree of wage rigidity may partly explain differences
in unemployment rates across countries. Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) show that downward nominal wage
rigidity estimated from industry-level data of OECD countries is higher in cases where employment protection
legislation is stricter, and union density and inflation higher; and that lower unemployment is associated with
lower nominal wage rigidity.
Not only can wage rigidity impact on unemployment, but it may also affect inflation dynamics. The findings of
the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence research Network (IPN) conclude that wage rigidity can be a cause of
price stickiness observed in the euro area. Numerous papers document that prices change less frequently
for products with a larger labour share, like services (Altissimo et al., 2006; Álvarez et al., 2006; Dhyne et al.,
2006; Vermeulen et al., 2007). It was suggested that this may be due to sluggish marginal costs, in particular
rigid wages. Dhyne et al. (2006) report evidence of downward consumer price stickiness in the services
sector, which might be related to downward wage rigidity. In addition, Aucremanne and Collin (2006) find that
changes in the wage formation process in Belgium have had a significant impact on the inflation process.
In sum, wage rigidity is one of the aspects of labour market rigidity. The macroeconomic consequences of
wage rigidity may go beyond those on job flows and  unemployment. Price stickiness implies that output
becomes the prominent adjustment variable to shocks, leading to higher real volatility (see Altissimo et al.,
2006). Further inflation persistence implies that monetary policy requires stronger interest rate changes to
impact  on  inflation;  leading  in  turn  to  stronger  output  variations.  The  nature  of  wage  rigidity  is  also  of
macroeconomic relevance. When nominal wages are rigid, inflation may "grease" the economy because it
allows a reduction in real wages (see among others Akerlof et al., 1996). On the other hand, the influence of
inflation on real wages is limited or absent when real wages are rigid.7
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The theoretical and empirical literature on wage rigidity, as reviewed in Camba-Mendez et al. (2003), Holden
(2004)  and  Kramarz  (2001),  is  large  and  has  initially  focused  on  downward  nominal  rigidity,  i.e.  the
resistance of workers to nominal wage cuts. Studies on the United States, like Altonji and Devereux (2000)
and Akerlof et al. (1996), consistently find evidence of downward nominal rigidity. Studies on Europe, like
Dessy (2005), Dickens et al. (2006, 2007) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2005), find a lot of cross-country
variation and generally less nominal rigidity than in the United States.
There have been relatively few studies of downward real rigidity based on micro data, contrary to the large
literature measuring real rigidity with macro data (Campbell, 1997; Layard et  al., 1991). Macroeconomic
estimates of wage rigidity typically take the sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment rates or demand
variables as an indicator of wage rigidity. Downward wage rigidity is then measured as the resistance of
wage cuts to adverse economic shocks (as in Biscourp et al., 2005). The present paper rests on individual
earnings data. Downward wage rigidity is measured as the fraction of workers who experience a (nominal/
real)  wage  freeze  when  they  were  scheduled  for  a  (nominal/  real)  wage  cut.  So,  when  wages  are
downwardly  rigid  in  our  sense,  they  will  not  respond  to  changes  in  economic  conditions  and  a
macroeconomic estimation should also highlight  wage rigidity. The reverse is not necessarily true. For a
given macroeconomic shock, the firm may need to change its average wage bill, and may easily do so when
the shock is positive. However, it may want to distribute the wage gain unevenly across workers, due to
differences in individual productivity, effort compensation policy, and so on. Assuming that this implies (real
or  nominal)  wage  cuts  for  some  workers,  a  microeconomic  analysis  may  reveal  wage  rigidity  where  a
macroeconomic one will not.
This paper contributes to the understanding of wage rigidity by evaluating the degree of downward real and
nominal rigidity (DRWR and DNWR) across several groups of workers and firms. The aim is threefold. First,
we provide measures of downward real and nominal wage rigidities and evaluate their relative importance.
Consistent with institutional features of the Belgian labour market and in accordance with previous estimates
for Belgium,
1 our results point to a high degree of real wage rigidity and a very low degree of nominal rigidity.
Second,  we  examine  the  differences  in  wage  rigidity  across  several  categories  of  workers  defined  by
occupational status, age, wage level, and gender. Wage rigidity may be heterogeneous across worker types
due  to  differences  in  hiring  and  firing  costs,  monitoring  costs,  differences  in  productivity  etc..  Third,  we
evaluate wage rigidity across different types of firm and their economic situation. More precisely, we examine
differences across firm size and firm quit rates. Finally, although wage rigidity may be high in normal times,
workers may accept earnings concessions as the fear of job loss increases when the firm experiences bad
times (see Carneiro and Portugal (2006) for evidence on this). We test whether wage rigidity is higher in
adverse economic conditions.
Several theoretical explanations have been put forward to explain wage rigidities. Efficiency wage models
rest  on  the  assumptions  that  unobservable  effort  of  workers  may be  stimulated  by  high/fair  wages  (see
1 Dickens et al (2006, 2007), as well as Knoppik and Beissinger (2005), consider Belgium as a country with rigid wages
when compared to other EU countries.
Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; and Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The turnover model assumes that
persistently high wages might increase profitability by reducing the quit rate and hence lowering expenditure
on hiring and training (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980, and Stiglitz, 1974). Higher wages may also raise the quality
of firm's applicant pool (Weiss, 1980). Insider-outsider theories also generate real wage rigidity (Lindbeck
and Snower, 1988). Since workers’ individual characteristics such as age or tenure, education, job type or
wage level may imply different worker productivity, on-the-job experience, replacement costs, ability to find a
job and monitoring cost, these theories also predict that wage rigidity may vary across blue-collar and white-
collar workers, across workers of different age classes, or different wage levels.
In addition to these theoretical predictions, institutional features of the Belgian labour market have to be
taken  into  consideration.  Full  automatic  indexation  and  high  coverage  and  scope  of  collective  wage
bargaining could have a positive impact on wage rigidity. On the other hand, extra-wage components of
earnings are more flexible than the base wage. As these are more important for older workers and higher
wage  earners,  wage  rigidity  may  be  reduced  for  these  categories  of  workers.  Note  also  that  collective
bargaining in Belgium is organised separately for white and blue collars.
Empirical  estimates  of  downward  wage  rigidity  for  Belgium  are  scarce  and  rather  limited  in  the
methodologies and data sets applied.
2 We rely on a new large microeconomic data set on earnings from
administrative sources for Belgium over the period 1990-2002. The data is collected by the social security
administration and is used to compute individual retirement benefits. Administrative data tend to be more
accurate than survey data (see Biscourp et al., 2005). In general, survey data are less reliable because they
often suffer from measurement and reporting errors. In particular, rounding errors may bias wage changes
towards  zero,  leading  to  an  overestimation  of  nominal  wage  rigidity.  Our  administrative  data  set  reports
annual  earnings  without  distinguishing  between  the  base  wage  and  other  components  of  labour
compensation. This feature is likely to be present in survey data as well, where different respondents may
also  have  different  definitions  of  wage  in  mind.  One  drawback  of  our  administrative  dataset  is  that  it
measures total earnings per working day and not base wage per hour worked. In the period under review,
cuts in working time were often negotiated as a substitute for wage increases, in particular for blue-collar
workers. This should not have too big influence on our wage measure. On the other hand, cyclical variations
in hours per working day - e.g. overtime hours - can bias our wage measure. In the way that hours worked
adapt more quickly to changes  in economic activity than the number of  employees. Consequently, daily
wage increases could be biased upwards (downwards) at the beginning of upturns (downturns).
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the main institutional features of the Belgian labour
market. The third section surveys the predictions of labour market models concerning the degree of wage
rigidity for  worker  categories  considered  in  the  empirical  section.  Section  4  introduces  our  data  set  and
2 For Belgium, Borghijs (2001) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) analyse downward nominal wage rigidity based on
survey  data.  Royer  and  Van  Audenrode  (2002)  rely  on  a  sample  of  administrative  wage  data  for  the  period
1978-1985. Their data set is also used in the IWFP exercise (Dickens et al., 2006, 2007).9
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The theoretical and empirical literature on wage rigidity, as reviewed in Camba-Mendez et al. (2003), Holden
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presents  the IWFP methodology. Section  5 discusses our results and  wraps up  with several  robustness
analyses. Section 6 concludes.
2. Wage formation institutions in Belgium
In  Belgian  companies,  gross  wages  are  mainly  determined  through  agreements  concluded  in  joint
committees
3 organised per sector of economic activity. The outcome of these sector-specific negotiations
cannot  undercut  the  legally  determined  guaranteed  minimum  wage.
4  However,  it  can  possibly  be
supplemented with agreements concluded at the firm level, which are bound by the sectoral agreements. All
employees'  gross  wages  are  linked  to  an  index  of  consumer  prices  through  an  automatic  indexation
mechanism. Moreover, in the period under review, a lot of employees receive automatic wage increases with
age and, to a lesser extent, tenure.
The indexation mechanism implies that nominal gross wages of Belgian employees are automatically index-
linked according to the evolution of a the national index of consumer prices.
5 From 1994 onwards, wages
have been adapted according to a lagged moving average of the so-called health index, i.e. the national
index of consumer prices excluding alcoholic beverages, tobacco and motor fuels. As a result of this policy
measure, indexation slowed down in 1995 and 1996.
Real wage increases are negotiated in the joint committees, sometimes followed by firm-level agreements.
The joint committees establish a job grading for employees. A pay scale is then assigned to this job grade,
which specifies a minimum wage for each specified employee category. Belgian labour legislation makes a
strict distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers. This is historically so, partly because blue-
collar workers were regarded as less specialised and therefore more easily substitutable than white collars.
White collars typically had more specific jobs; making on-the-job experience more important than for blue-
collar workers. Hiring and training costs may be higher for white-collar workers. Firing costs and regulations
are also heavier for white collars. All this explains why most of the joint committees are responsible for just
one  of  these  occupations  in  each  sector,  blue-collar  workers  receiving  an  hourly  wage  and  white-collar
workers receiving a monthly salary. Only a few committees set wages for both blue-collar and white-collar
workers.
In the joint committees for blue-collar workers, pay scales are primarily defined solely in relation to the job
description. Variations depending on age or length of service are not common. For white-collar workers, the
pay scale usually varies not just by category, but also depending on age or length of service.
6 Moreover,
3    They  are  called  joint  committees  ('commissions  paritaires'),  because  employers  and  employees  share  an  equal
representation in them. As the notion of economic sector is sometimes very narrowly defined, the number of joint
committees exceeds 100.
4  The actual minimum wage in almost every joint committee exceeds the legally guaranteed minimum, with some
exceptions for workers less than 21 years old.
5 The way this automatic price indexation of wages is implemented constitutes an agreement in the joint committees. In
some committees, wages are indexed at fixed points in time (e.g. every two, three or four months), in others wages
(e.g. the minimum wage) are indexed each time the index exceeds a certain threshold (typically, the threshold value
is defined as the previous value plus two percent).
6 During the period under review, age-related pay scales were not against European anti-discrimination rules and were
applicable to the majority of Belgian white-collar workers.
these workers can in many cases expect to be automatically promoted merely because of their age at some
points in their career. An age-related earnings profile is therefore most prevalent among white-collar workers,
particularly the higher categories, but much less common for blue-collar workers.
7 From the start of their
career, and even if they remain within one category (i.e. without any form of promotion), white-collar workers
can expect to receive significant pay increases on the basis of their age.
Figure 1 – Average pay scale for white-collar workers as a function of their age
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Source: FPS Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue.
Based on data from the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue (FPS ELSD) for
1999, the influence of age and/or length of service, including the effect of automatic age-related promotions,
can be investigated.
8 Figure 1 reports how the average pay scale of white collars automatically increases
with age. Pay scales are fixed for all workers of the same job/scale/category. It appears that white-collar
workers  receive  an  automatic  wage  increase  of  around  1  percent  on  average  each  year.  Most  of  the
automatic increase stems from a rise along the pay scale of one job (i.e. within jobs), another part is due to
automatic age-related promotions to a job with a higher pay scale (i.e. over jobs). The figure shows that
these automatic pay rises are strongest in the first half of the career and decrease with age to become
negligible after the age of  50. Section 3.2  gives a short overview of economic theories explaining these
institutional features.
7 According to the FPS ELSD, the joint committees for which age or length of service affect the scale structure include
5 joint committees or subcommittees for blue-collar workers (responsible for 7.8 p.c. of the total number of workers in
these sectors), 17 for white-collar workers (97.0 p.c.) and 22 combined joint committees (51.5 p.c. of employees in
the sectors for which they are responsible, or 27.6 p.c. of the blue-collar workers in question and 65.0 p.c. of the
white-collar workers).
8   In most cases, age is the determining variable rather than tenure, the latter is often defined as years of service in the
sector. Also given the relatively long average tenure of Belgian workers, the age-related wage profile is very relevant.
An analysis of these data and the consequences of age-related wages can be found in Delhez et al. (2006).11
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During the period under review, the government has intervened directly in the wage formation process. After
wage increases that were regarded as excessive in the early 1990s, the indexation mechanism was changed
in  1994  and  a  real-wage  freeze  was  enforced  in  1995-1996.  It  was  forbidden  to  negotiate  real  wage
increases in the joint committees, but automatic increases  due to indexation, age, tenure or changes in
category were still allowed.
Table 1 illustrates the lag between the CPI and indexation. Further, it highlights the impact of government
interventions on the  labour market in 1995-1996,  which  essentially amounts to strong  wage moderation.
Wage increases due to indexation and collectively agreed real increases were at their lower levels in these
years, as shown in the first three columns in Table 1. Table 1 also shows that nominal wage increases were
30 to 40 percent lower in 1995 and 1996 than over the rest of the period. These measures induce a shift of
the wage change distribution to the left; the median decreases while the standard deviation did not change.
This explains the increase in the proportion of negative wage changes observed in years 1995 and 1996.
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics on inflation, indexation and the earnings change distribution
¨ln (wage)
year CPI inflation indexation  "collective" mean st. dev. median ¨ln(w)<0
1991 0.031 0.035 0.048 0.069 0.074 0.062 0.055
1992 0.024 0.026 0.043 0.053 0.073 0.046 0.066
1993 0.028 0.027 0.035 0.053 0.073 0.046 0.066
1994 0.023 0.014 0.027 0.042 0.074 0.033 0.079
1995 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.031 0.075 0.022 0.093
1996 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.030 0.074 0.019 0.107
1997 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.041 0.081 0.029 0.083
1998 0.010 0.012 0.019 0.043 0.082 0.029 0.088
1999 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.045 0.088 0.030 0.091
2000 0.025 0.015 0.028 0.055 0.090 0.038 0.086
2001 0.025 0.025 0.033 0.056 0.090 0.045 0.086
2002 0.016 0.023 0.038 0.051 0.090 0.041 0.096
Note: "collective" refers to automatic indexation plus collectively agreed real wage increases; ¨ln(wage) stands for the
first difference of the logarithm of daily earnings. %¨ln(w)<0 refers to the percentage of wage changes below zero.
After that period of strong wage moderation, the so-called wage norm came into practice, which constitutes
an overall maximum margin for the growth of nominal hourly labour costs in Belgian enterprises. According
to the law of July 1996 for the promotion of employment and the safeguarding of firms' competitiveness,
social partners
9 should fix such a norm every other year for a two-year period, taking into account a report
written by the Central Economic Council (CEC).
10 In this report, the CEC estimates the maximum scope for a
rise of firms' hourly labour costs as a weighted average of the expected nominal labour cost evolution in
Belgium's three main neighbouring countries (Germany, France and the Netherlands) over the coming two
years. Official estimates of expected automatic indexation of nominal wages, based on inflation projections
by  the  Federal  Planning  Bureau,  and  estimates  of  labour  cost  growth  through  automatic  increases  are
subtracted from the nominal wage norm, thus determining the margin for real wage increases.
9  In the event of no agreement between the social partners, the government can fix a wage norm that contains at least
indexation and other automatic increases, which happened in 1997-1998.
10   Social partners have representatives in the Council.
The joint committees at sector level not only determine to a large extent the structure of pay scales between
different worker types, but they are also the main bargaining unit for the negotiations on collective wage
increases, taking into account the wage norm. Quite often, these collective wage increases are defined as an
absolute rise of the (sometimes only minimum) pay scales, meaning that employees earning wages above
the scale can obtain a lower percentage collective wage increase.
For the analysis of wage rigidity, it is important to bear in mind that part of all employees' nominal wage
increases  is  automatic  due  to  indexation  and  therefore  almost  equal  for  everyone.  The  remainder  of
individual  wage  increases  is  determined  by  collective  agreements  at  the  sector  and  firm  level  and  by
individual factors, and is thus more variable. This implies that the automatic part of wage increases that is
almost equal for every worker decreases when inflation is low. One should also remember that wages and
wage increases for blue-collar workers and for white-collar workers are mostly bargained separately, and
that collective wage increases can be relatively less important for high-wage earners. White-collar workers
have larger automatic wage increases than blue-collar workers, and these automatic pay rises decline with
age. Finally, the period 1995-1996 was atypical, with direct government intervention in wage formation.
3. Predictions of labour market theories
In this section, we review several prominent labour market theories, such as the efficiency wage, turnover,
insider-outsider  and  contract  theories,  and  discuss  their  predictions  regarding  the  degree  of  rigidity  for
different categories of workers and firms considered in the paper. The most readily available predictions are
related to occupational status, tenure, age of workers and turnover costs of the firm. In our data set, we only
have information on age and hence we have to rely on the correlation between tenure and age in cases
where the model predictions relate to tenure. As explained in Section 2, a majority of workers in Belgium in
the period under review experienced automatic wage increases according to age rather than tenure.
According to the efficiency wage theory, workers' productivity (effort) depends positively on their wage, and
hence firms might refrain from cutting wages because it could reduce profits. There are several possible
explanations why productivity might depend on wages. In the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), a
cut in earnings lowers the cost of job loss, thereby inducing more workers to shirk. In the gift-exchange
model (Akerlof, 1982) and the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), a fall in earnings leads
to lower gratitude and loyalty to the firm, again reducing effort.
Because the effort of white-collar workers is very difficult to monitor, firms may be more reluctant to cut
wages of white-collar workers than blue-collar workers whose output can often be quantified. As a result, the
efficiency wage theory predicts that earnings of white-collar workers are more rigid.
When considering the tenure profile of wages predicted by Lazear (1984) together with the shirking model,
we conclude that the cost of job loss is higher for older workers and workers with higher tenure. Indeed, it is13
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individual  wage  increases  is  determined  by  collective  agreements  at  the  sector  and  firm  level  and  by
individual factors, and is thus more variable. This implies that the automatic part of wage increases that is
almost equal for every worker decreases when inflation is low. One should also remember that wages and
wage increases for blue-collar workers and for white-collar workers are mostly bargained separately, and
that collective wage increases can be relatively less important for high-wage earners. White-collar workers
have larger automatic wage increases than blue-collar workers, and these automatic pay rises decline with
age. Finally, the period 1995-1996 was atypical, with direct government intervention in wage formation.
3. Predictions of labour market theories
In this section, we review several prominent labour market theories, such as the efficiency wage, turnover,
insider-outsider  and  contract  theories,  and  discuss  their  predictions  regarding  the  degree  of  rigidity  for
different categories of workers and firms considered in the paper. The most readily available predictions are
related to occupational status, tenure, age of workers and turnover costs of the firm. In our data set, we only
have information on age and hence we have to rely on the correlation between tenure and age in cases
where the model predictions relate to tenure. As explained in Section 2, a majority of workers in Belgium in
the period under review experienced automatic wage increases according to age rather than tenure.
According to the efficiency wage theory, workers' productivity (effort) depends positively on their wage, and
hence firms might refrain from cutting wages because it could reduce profits. There are several possible
explanations why productivity might depend on wages. In the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), a
cut in earnings lowers the cost of job loss, thereby inducing more workers to shirk. In the gift-exchange
model (Akerlof, 1982) and the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), a fall in earnings leads
to lower gratitude and loyalty to the firm, again reducing effort.
Because the effort of white-collar workers is very difficult to monitor, firms may be more reluctant to cut
wages of white-collar workers than blue-collar workers whose output can often be quantified. As a result, the
efficiency wage theory predicts that earnings of white-collar workers are more rigid.
When considering the tenure profile of wages predicted by Lazear (1984) together with the shirking model,
we conclude that the cost of job loss is higher for older workers and workers with higher tenure. Indeed, it is14
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typically more difficult for older workers to find a new job and workers with long tenure often lose their tenure
component of compensation when changing employers. As a result, a wage cut - ceteris paribus - induces
more younger workers to shirk which implies lower likelihood of a wage cut for young workers and higher
rigidity for them.
The relative wage level influences not only productivity but also the propensity of employees to quit. Wage
cuts might increase the turnover of employees and have a negative impact on profitability. In the turnover
model of Stiglitz (1974), firms that cut wages will experience more job quits and incur higher costs of hiring
and training new workers. Since the training and hiring costs are typically higher for white-collar workers than
for blue-collar workers, the turnover model predicts higher wage rigidity for white-collar workers.
The turnover model also predicts that firms with high turnover costs invest in creation of long-term bonds with
their employees (e.g. in the form of the implicit contracts of Lazear, 1979). If successful, such firms would
exhibit fewer (voluntary and involuntary) quits. Hence, we expect to find a lower degree of rigidity among
firms with lower quit rates, all else equal.
Hashimoto and Yu (1980) point out that current employees who have acquired firm-specific human capital
are more productive than identical individuals with no experience at the firm. It is reasonable to assume that
firm-specific human capital has much stronger impact on the productivity of white-collar workers than blue-
collar workers and hence we again expect more rigid wages of white-collar workers. As firm-specific human
capital increases with tenure, firms will be less willing to cut wages of employees with higher tenure and run
the risk of them leaving. It predicts that employees with higher tenure will have more rigid wages.
When applying the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980) to quits, the most productive workers are most
likely to quit their job after a wage cut. As white-collar workers are more difficult and costly to replace due to
their specialised skills, firms are less willing to cut their wages leading to higher wage rigidity. Higher cost of
job loss for older and more tenured workers imply that younger workers are more likely to quit after a given
wage cut, all else equal. This leads to more rigid wages of young workers.
According to the  insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck  and Snower, 1988), firms  do not dismiss their current
workers and replace them by job-seekers at lower wage because insiders can harass or refuse to cooperate
with newly hired entrants. This implies that workers with higher tenure have more power in the wage-setting
process  than  recently  hired  employees,  something  which  leads  to  higher  wage  rigidity  for  tenured
employees. The productivity of white-collar workers is typically more directly linked to their integration into
the work process (e.g. because blue-collar workers at an assembly line do not need much cooperation with
other workers while teamwork is common for white-collar workers). As a result, the model predicts that white-
collar workers exhibit a higher degree of wage rigidity than blue-collar workers.
The  contract  theory  of  Fisher  (1977)  and  Taylor  (1979)  explains  wage  rigidity  as  a  result  of  long-term
contracts between firms and workers that set wages in advance and are negotiated on a staggered basis.
Since short-term contracts are much more common for young workers, the contract theory predicts lower
wage rigidity of young workers. According to the implicit contract theory (Baily, 1974), wage rigidity is a result
of workers' risk aversion. Since workers prefer a stable real wage, a firm can offer its workers a steady wage
that would be on average below what it would otherwise have to pay because the stable wage forms a
compensating differential. Based on the relative importance of labour income and asset income over the
lifecycle, the lifecycle risk aversion hypothesis predicts that risk aversion increases with age.
11 Using time
series  data,  Bakshi  and  Chen  (1994)  find  evidence  that  supports  the  lifecycle  risk  aversion  hypothesis.
Hence, if firms accommodate workers’ preferences with respect to the stability of their earnings, the earnings
of older workers would be more steady and hence more rigid.
In summary, all the theories discussed above, except for the contract theory, predict higher wage rigidity for
white-collar workers. The efficiency wage theories and the adverse selection model applied to quits suggest
that younger workers are subject to a higher degree of wage rigidity. On the other hand, the firm-specific
human capital model and insider-outsider theory predict more rigid wages for workers with higher tenure.
The  contract  theory concludes  that  younger  workers  should  have  less  rigid  wages.  The  turnover  model
expects to find a lower degree of rigidity among firms with lower quit rates. In their survey, Campbell and
Kamlani (1997) find strong support for explanations of wage rigidity based on the dependence of quits and
effort on wages but hardly any support for the insider-outsider theory.
4. Data and methodology
4.1. Data description
We  rely  on  an  administrative  database  on  labour  earnings  for  Belgium  collected  by  the  social  security
system. The data set contains a sample of around one-third of workers in the private sector and covers the
period  1990-2002.  The  data  we  use  contain  information  on  annual  gross  earnings  (including  bonuses),
annual working days, age, sex and occupation category (blue-collar or white-collar). Our data set offers two
advantages compared to previous studies for Belgium. First, administrative data are often considered more
reliable than survey data (Biscourp et al., 2005). In particular, misperception and rounding errors are typical
measurement errors of survey data. Second, the  period covered is longer and more recent than similar
administrative data for Belgium used by Royer and Van Audenrode (2002). Their data set covers the period
1976-1986. Our analysis thus includes more recent Belgian labour market developments and institutional
changes related to the wage bargaining process, such as government intervention in the wage formation and
indexation mechanisms, and the wage norm.
For confidentiality reasons, natural persons and firms with less than 5 employees are left out of the sample.
The data set covers all sectors of activity including services. It includes all persons that were born between
the 5
th and the 15
th day of any month. As the selection criterion is independent of workers' or employers'
11  The further a person is from retirement, the more risk he is willing to accept in his investments since the number of
paychecks he expects to get is large and labour income can offset any adverse investment outcomes.15
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typically more difficult for older workers to find a new job and workers with long tenure often lose their tenure
component of compensation when changing employers. As a result, a wage cut - ceteris paribus - induces
more younger workers to shirk which implies lower likelihood of a wage cut for young workers and higher
rigidity for them.
The relative wage level influences not only productivity but also the propensity of employees to quit. Wage
cuts might increase the turnover of employees and have a negative impact on profitability. In the turnover
model of Stiglitz (1974), firms that cut wages will experience more job quits and incur higher costs of hiring
and training new workers. Since the training and hiring costs are typically higher for white-collar workers than
for blue-collar workers, the turnover model predicts higher wage rigidity for white-collar workers.
The turnover model also predicts that firms with high turnover costs invest in creation of long-term bonds with
their employees (e.g. in the form of the implicit contracts of Lazear, 1979). If successful, such firms would
exhibit fewer (voluntary and involuntary) quits. Hence, we expect to find a lower degree of rigidity among
firms with lower quit rates, all else equal.
Hashimoto and Yu (1980) point out that current employees who have acquired firm-specific human capital
are more productive than identical individuals with no experience at the firm. It is reasonable to assume that
firm-specific human capital has much stronger impact on the productivity of white-collar workers than blue-
collar workers and hence we again expect more rigid wages of white-collar workers. As firm-specific human
capital increases with tenure, firms will be less willing to cut wages of employees with higher tenure and run
the risk of them leaving. It predicts that employees with higher tenure will have more rigid wages.
When applying the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980) to quits, the most productive workers are most
likely to quit their job after a wage cut. As white-collar workers are more difficult and costly to replace due to
their specialised skills, firms are less willing to cut their wages leading to higher wage rigidity. Higher cost of
job loss for older and more tenured workers imply that younger workers are more likely to quit after a given
wage cut, all else equal. This leads to more rigid wages of young workers.
According to the  insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck  and Snower, 1988), firms  do not dismiss their current
workers and replace them by job-seekers at lower wage because insiders can harass or refuse to cooperate
with newly hired entrants. This implies that workers with higher tenure have more power in the wage-setting
process  than  recently  hired  employees,  something  which  leads  to  higher  wage  rigidity  for  tenured
employees. The productivity of white-collar workers is typically more directly linked to their integration into
the work process (e.g. because blue-collar workers at an assembly line do not need much cooperation with
other workers while teamwork is common for white-collar workers). As a result, the model predicts that white-
collar workers exhibit a higher degree of wage rigidity than blue-collar workers.
The  contract  theory  of  Fisher  (1977)  and  Taylor  (1979)  explains  wage  rigidity  as  a  result  of  long-term
contracts between firms and workers that set wages in advance and are negotiated on a staggered basis.
Since short-term contracts are much more common for young workers, the contract theory predicts lower
wage rigidity of young workers. According to the implicit contract theory (Baily, 1974), wage rigidity is a result
of workers' risk aversion. Since workers prefer a stable real wage, a firm can offer its workers a steady wage
that would be on average below what it would otherwise have to pay because the stable wage forms a
compensating differential. Based on the relative importance of labour income and asset income over the
lifecycle, the lifecycle risk aversion hypothesis predicts that risk aversion increases with age.
11 Using time
series  data,  Bakshi  and  Chen  (1994)  find  evidence  that  supports  the  lifecycle  risk  aversion  hypothesis.
Hence, if firms accommodate workers’ preferences with respect to the stability of their earnings, the earnings
of older workers would be more steady and hence more rigid.
In summary, all the theories discussed above, except for the contract theory, predict higher wage rigidity for
white-collar workers. The efficiency wage theories and the adverse selection model applied to quits suggest
that younger workers are subject to a higher degree of wage rigidity. On the other hand, the firm-specific
human capital model and insider-outsider theory predict more rigid wages for workers with higher tenure.
The  contract  theory concludes  that  younger  workers  should  have  less  rigid  wages.  The  turnover  model
expects to find a lower degree of rigidity among firms with lower quit rates. In their survey, Campbell and
Kamlani (1997) find strong support for explanations of wage rigidity based on the dependence of quits and
effort on wages but hardly any support for the insider-outsider theory.
4. Data and methodology
4.1. Data description
We  rely  on  an  administrative  database  on  labour  earnings  for  Belgium  collected  by  the  social  security
system. The data set contains a sample of around one-third of workers in the private sector and covers the
period  1990-2002.  The  data  we  use  contain  information  on  annual  gross  earnings  (including  bonuses),
annual working days, age, sex and occupation category (blue-collar or white-collar). Our data set offers two
advantages compared to previous studies for Belgium. First, administrative data are often considered more
reliable than survey data (Biscourp et al., 2005). In particular, misperception and rounding errors are typical
measurement errors of survey data. Second, the  period covered is longer and more recent than similar
administrative data for Belgium used by Royer and Van Audenrode (2002). Their data set covers the period
1976-1986. Our analysis thus includes more recent Belgian labour market developments and institutional
changes related to the wage bargaining process, such as government intervention in the wage formation and
indexation mechanisms, and the wage norm.
For confidentiality reasons, natural persons and firms with less than 5 employees are left out of the sample.
The data set covers all sectors of activity including services. It includes all persons that were born between
the 5
th and the 15
th day of any month. As the selection criterion is independent of workers' or employers'
11  The further a person is from retirement, the more risk he is willing to accept in his investments since the number of
paychecks he expects to get is large and labour income can offset any adverse investment outcomes.16
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characteristics, our sample is representative with respect to the entire population. We restrict the sample to
full-time permanent job-stayers in firms in branches with NACE codes from C to K, aged between 18 and 64
for men and 59 for women, and having no more than one month of sick leave (or other "abnormal" days off)
per year, and working at least 11 months for the same employer. We also exclude earnings below the legal
minimum wage and we drop the same number of observations from the upper tail of the distribution.
12 Tables
A3 and A4 in the Appendix provide summary statistics on the earnings and earnings change distribution.
Typical features of the wage structure are also apparent in our data set: women earn 20 percent less than
men; earnings increase with age; blue-collar workers have lower earnings levels, smaller wage increases
and lower dispersion of earnings than white-collar workers. Finally, large firms pay on average higher wages
and have a more heterogeneous wage structure than smaller firms.
Notwithstanding  the  uncertainties  surrounding  the  methodological  choice  and  sample  selection,  it  is
important to stress two characteristics of the data we analyse, and their implication for measuring downward
wage rigidity. We evaluate DRWR and DNWR from the distribution of  the changes  in the  log of  annual
earnings divided by the number of work days of full-time job stayers.
13 First, annual earnings include other
components of compensation than the base wage, such as bonuses, premiums, overtime hours paid, and so
on. Histograms of earnings changes reported in the Appendix indicate that, in spite of full indexation, there
are some wage changes  below indexation, denoted  as I, and even below zero. The reason is that total
earnings include extra-base wage components mentioned above. These may be more flexible than the base
wage and may not be subject to labour market mechanisms such as indexation and collectively agreed real
wage increases.
Second, restricting the sample to full-time job stayers might blur the picture of wage rigidity if job movers,
temporary workers or part-time workers have a different degree of wage rigidity. Evaluating wage rigidity for
part-time  workers  is  difficult  since  we  have  no  reliable  information  on  the  percentage  of  time  worked.
Excluding temporary workers and manpower workers might have some incidence on our measure of wage
rigidity.  Indeed,  Kleinknecht  et  al.  (2006)  report  that  the  use  of  temporary  contracts  and  self-employed
(freelance) workers in the Netherlands allows firms to save on their average wage bill.
Concerning job mobility, Fehr and Goette (2005) found that job movers have more flexible wages than job
stayers  and  hence  our  estimates  may  instead  provide  an  upper  bound  of  wage  rigidity  for  the  entire
population of workers. We have performed two sets of analyses in order to gain a better understanding of the
potential impact of job movers on our measures of wage rigidity.
14 Firstly, we compare the first difference of
the log earnings of movers with that of stayers. On average, job movers experience larger wage increases
than stayers (0.057 and 0.045, respectively). But the main difference between the two groups is that the
12   The legal minimum wage is defined as the average guaranteed minimum monthly income for workers above the age
of 21.5 years and with a tenure of at least six months. Under certain circumstances, the reported earnings can be
lower, especially for younger workers.
13   The maximum number of work days is essentially the same for all full-time employees as it includes all work days, i.e.
everyday except Sunday. The number of days not worked and days for which there is no employer compensation
(such as sick days) are excluded from these.
14   The analysis is performed over the 1992-2001 period.
standard deviation of earnings changes is much larger for movers than for stayers (0.24 compared to 0.08).
This means that some job movers experience much larger earnings increases than job stayers, and some
movers incur much larger earnings losses than job stayers.
15 In short, from the point of view of workers,
earnings of job movers are more flexible than those of job stayers.
Next, we consider the point of view of the firm. We compute the median wage of stayers by firm, occupation
(white collar vs blue collar), sex and age category. We then compare the relative wages of entrants with
respect to this firm specific median, with the relative wages of stayers (again by occupation, sex and age
category). In contrast, to the previous findings, the volatility of earnings of entrants is only 15% larger than
that of incumbents (the standard deviation of the relative wage is 0.28 for entrants and 0.24 for incumbents).
The relative wage of new entrants is slightly lower than that of incumbents, which may be explained by the
fact that firms in Belgium do not pay holiday allowance the first year. This suggests that, on average, due to
fairness considerations, or some institutional features, entrants do not substantially increase wage flexibility
within the firm. Rather, these two pieces of evidence suggest that workers move from low-paying firms to
well-paying  firms,  or  vice  versa,  but  that  wage  flexibility  within  firms  is  quite  similar  for  entrants  and
incumbents. Since this paper focuses on wage rigidity rather than on wage and job mobility, we consider that
the point of view of firms is more relevant than the point of view of workers. Therefore, the finding of similar
variance in the wage of entrants and that of stayers suggests that focusing on job stayers alone should not
be harmful for our measures of rigidity.
Finally,  excluding  very  small  firms,  and  some  sectors  of  economic  activity  (agriculture,  fishery,  non-
commercial services and the public sector) may have an indeterminate impact on our estimates of wage
rigidity. However, this should not modify our analysis of the relative wage rigidity across worker or firm types.
4.2. Estimation of DNWR and DRWR
Measures of downward wage rigidity based on microeconomic data rest on the idea that one is likely to
observe fewer wage cuts and more wage freezes under rigidity. This will impact on the properties of the
distribution of individual wage changes, such as symmetry, spike at zero (or another defined reference point
such as expected inflation), or on the behaviour of wage changes, in particular their sensitivity to economic
shocks. Alternative empirical measures of wage rigidities based on these ideas have flourished over the last
ten years.
Mc Laughlin's (1994) starting point is that downward wage rigidity (and upward wage flexibility) induce a
spike at zero, few wage cuts and positive skewness. Simple measures of wage rigidity, as used in Dickens et
al.  (2007)  are  based  on  the  notions  of  symmetry and  spike  of  the  distribution  of  wage  changes.  In  the
presence of DNWR, some of the wage changes that would have been negative in the absence of rigidity are
concentrated at zero. This generates a spike at zero in the distribution of price changes (see Figure A1 in the
Appendix). Dickens et al. (2007) define a simple measure of nominal rigidity as the ratio of the height of the
15 Unfortunately, we cannot make any distinction between voluntary quits and layoffs.17
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characteristics, our sample is representative with respect to the entire population. We restrict the sample to
full-time permanent job-stayers in firms in branches with NACE codes from C to K, aged between 18 and 64
for men and 59 for women, and having no more than one month of sick leave (or other "abnormal" days off)
per year, and working at least 11 months for the same employer. We also exclude earnings below the legal
minimum wage and we drop the same number of observations from the upper tail of the distribution.
12 Tables
A3 and A4 in the Appendix provide summary statistics on the earnings and earnings change distribution.
Typical features of the wage structure are also apparent in our data set: women earn 20 percent less than
men; earnings increase with age; blue-collar workers have lower earnings levels, smaller wage increases
and lower dispersion of earnings than white-collar workers. Finally, large firms pay on average higher wages
and have a more heterogeneous wage structure than smaller firms.
Notwithstanding  the  uncertainties  surrounding  the  methodological  choice  and  sample  selection,  it  is
important to stress two characteristics of the data we analyse, and their implication for measuring downward
wage rigidity. We evaluate DRWR and DNWR from the distribution of  the changes  in the  log of  annual
earnings divided by the number of work days of full-time job stayers.
13 First, annual earnings include other
components of compensation than the base wage, such as bonuses, premiums, overtime hours paid, and so
on. Histograms of earnings changes reported in the Appendix indicate that, in spite of full indexation, there
are some wage changes  below indexation, denoted  as I, and even below zero. The reason is that total
earnings include extra-base wage components mentioned above. These may be more flexible than the base
wage and may not be subject to labour market mechanisms such as indexation and collectively agreed real
wage increases.
Second, restricting the sample to full-time job stayers might blur the picture of wage rigidity if job movers,
temporary workers or part-time workers have a different degree of wage rigidity. Evaluating wage rigidity for
part-time  workers  is  difficult  since  we  have  no  reliable  information  on  the  percentage  of  time  worked.
Excluding temporary workers and manpower workers might have some incidence on our measure of wage
rigidity.  Indeed,  Kleinknecht  et  al.  (2006)  report  that  the  use  of  temporary  contracts  and  self-employed
(freelance) workers in the Netherlands allows firms to save on their average wage bill.
Concerning job mobility, Fehr and Goette (2005) found that job movers have more flexible wages than job
stayers  and  hence  our  estimates  may  instead  provide  an  upper  bound  of  wage  rigidity  for  the  entire
population of workers. We have performed two sets of analyses in order to gain a better understanding of the
potential impact of job movers on our measures of wage rigidity.
14 Firstly, we compare the first difference of
the log earnings of movers with that of stayers. On average, job movers experience larger wage increases
than stayers (0.057 and 0.045, respectively). But the main difference between the two groups is that the
12   The legal minimum wage is defined as the average guaranteed minimum monthly income for workers above the age
of 21.5 years and with a tenure of at least six months. Under certain circumstances, the reported earnings can be
lower, especially for younger workers.
13   The maximum number of work days is essentially the same for all full-time employees as it includes all work days, i.e.
everyday except Sunday. The number of days not worked and days for which there is no employer compensation
(such as sick days) are excluded from these.
14   The analysis is performed over the 1992-2001 period.
standard deviation of earnings changes is much larger for movers than for stayers (0.24 compared to 0.08).
This means that some job movers experience much larger earnings increases than job stayers, and some
movers incur much larger earnings losses than job stayers.
15 In short, from the point of view of workers,
earnings of job movers are more flexible than those of job stayers.
Next, we consider the point of view of the firm. We compute the median wage of stayers by firm, occupation
(white collar vs blue collar), sex and age category. We then compare the relative wages of entrants with
respect to this firm specific median, with the relative wages of stayers (again by occupation, sex and age
category). In contrast, to the previous findings, the volatility of earnings of entrants is only 15% larger than
that of incumbents (the standard deviation of the relative wage is 0.28 for entrants and 0.24 for incumbents).
The relative wage of new entrants is slightly lower than that of incumbents, which may be explained by the
fact that firms in Belgium do not pay holiday allowance the first year. This suggests that, on average, due to
fairness considerations, or some institutional features, entrants do not substantially increase wage flexibility
within the firm. Rather, these two pieces of evidence suggest that workers move from low-paying firms to
well-paying  firms,  or  vice  versa,  but  that  wage  flexibility  within  firms  is  quite  similar  for  entrants  and
incumbents. Since this paper focuses on wage rigidity rather than on wage and job mobility, we consider that
the point of view of firms is more relevant than the point of view of workers. Therefore, the finding of similar
variance in the wage of entrants and that of stayers suggests that focusing on job stayers alone should not
be harmful for our measures of rigidity.
Finally,  excluding  very  small  firms,  and  some  sectors  of  economic  activity  (agriculture,  fishery,  non-
commercial services and the public sector) may have an indeterminate impact on our estimates of wage
rigidity. However, this should not modify our analysis of the relative wage rigidity across worker or firm types.
4.2. Estimation of DNWR and DRWR
Measures of downward wage rigidity based on microeconomic data rest on the idea that one is likely to
observe fewer wage cuts and more wage freezes under rigidity. This will impact on the properties of the
distribution of individual wage changes, such as symmetry, spike at zero (or another defined reference point
such as expected inflation), or on the behaviour of wage changes, in particular their sensitivity to economic
shocks. Alternative empirical measures of wage rigidities based on these ideas have flourished over the last
ten years.
Mc Laughlin's (1994) starting point is that downward wage rigidity (and upward wage flexibility) induce a
spike at zero, few wage cuts and positive skewness. Simple measures of wage rigidity, as used in Dickens et
al.  (2007)  are  based  on  the  notions  of  symmetry and  spike  of  the  distribution  of  wage  changes.  In  the
presence of DNWR, some of the wage changes that would have been negative in the absence of rigidity are
concentrated at zero. This generates a spike at zero in the distribution of price changes (see Figure A1 in the
Appendix). Dickens et al. (2007) define a simple measure of nominal rigidity as the ratio of the height of the
15 Unfortunately, we cannot make any distinction between voluntary quits and layoffs.18
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spike at zero and the area of the histogram below and at zero. In the absence of DNWR, the simple measure
approaches zero. The simple measure of real rigidity also rests on the idea that in case of DRWR, some of
the  wage  changes  that  would  have  been  below  expected  inflation,  ʌ
e,  are  concentrated  around  this
reference point (ʌ
e varies across individuals). Because part of these real wage freezes fall just below ʌ
e, and
part fall just above ʌ
e, this generates asymmetry in the distribution of price changes (see Figure A2 in the
Appendix). More precisely, the area of the histogram of wage changes below ʌ
e is smaller than that above
2*median - ʌ
e. Assuming that the spike around ʌ
e is symmetric, the difference between the two areas (the
top tail minus bottom tail), equals one half of the spike around ʌ
e. The simple measure of DRWR again
divides the area of the spike by the area of the histogram at or below the spike.
The approach of Kahn (1997), the so-called histogram-location approach, consists of two steps. First, annual
histograms of wage changes are constructed in order to compute factual bin sizes. She compares bins at a
given distance from the median, and computes their size for each year; and distance from median. Second,
these factual bin sizes are regressed on dummies for the case where the bin refers to a negative wage
change and a dummy for a zero (or around zero) wage change.
16 The larger the positive coefficient on the
dummy for zero wage changes, the higher the spike at zero, i.e. the larger the proportion of wage freezes.
The larger the negative coefficient on the dummy for negative wage changes, the higher the proportion of
wage changes that have not been cut. Taken together, these provide evidence of downward wage rigidity. In
essence, the method compares the size of the bins at a given distance from the median in  years when
rigidity may be binding (when those bars fall below zero) with their size in years where rigidities are absent
(when they fall above zero). The method is non-parametric as it requires no assumption on the distribution of
wage changes. It depends on observing years with wage increases at a particular distance from the median
bin and years of wage decreases at the same distance from the median bin. Further, it ignores the possibility
of the dispersion of wage changes varying over time.
Card  and  Hyslop  (1997)  compare  for  each  year  the  factual  distribution  of  wage  changes  with  the
counterfactual distribution that would hold in the absence of nominal wage rigidity. The latter is assumed to
be symmetric around the median wage change, and they assume that a given fraction of jobs are lost due to
wage rigidity. Further, they account for rounding and measurement errors. Their measure of rigidity is given
by the cumulative density of the notional distribution that is "swept up" to the nominal wage rigidity spike.
Their method is non-parametric as it imposes no assumption on the distribution function of wage changes.
Contrary to the simple measure described above, it does not take into account the height of the spike.
Another strand of the literature rests on the notion of wage sluggishness. It estimates wage rigidity from the
(in)sensitivity of wages to given shocks or variables. Among this literature, the "earnings-function approach"
of  Altonji  and  Devereux  (1999)  defines  the  notional  wage  change  that  holds  under  wage  flexibility as  a
function of individual characteristics. They estimate a latent variable model where factual wage increases are
equal to the notional increases, but wage cuts may be frozen or dampened in the event of wage rigidity.
Their specification nests both the flexible wage formation model and the model with downward rigidity, so
16 The interval around zero wage changes is intended to capture menu costs.
that they can be tested against each other. Although appealing in its definition of wage rigidity, this method
requires extensive and relevant data characterising the individuals and/or firms.
Our estimates of downward nominal and real rigidity are based on a new methodology to estimate DNWR
and DRWR that was recently developed by the IWFP. A technical discussion of the method can be found in
Dickens and Goette (2006).
17 Briefly, these measures of rigidity attempt to capture the fraction of workers
who would receive a (nominal or real) wage freeze when they were scheduled for a (nominal or real) wage
cut, no  matter  what the reason for the wage cut.  The methodology has several advantages. First, from
microeconomic data on wages, it provides an estimate of both DNWR and DRWR. Second, when focusing
on nominal wage rigidity, the natural cut-off point is at zero wage change. When examining real wage rigidity,
correctly  defining  the  relevant  index  to  compute  real  wages  becomes  an  important  issue.  The  IWFP
methodology estimates jointly DNWR, DRWR and the reference point for downward real wage rigidity, ʌ
e.
Third, Dickens and Goette (2006) also correct the factual distribution of wage changes for measurement
errors.
18 The corrected distribution is dubbed "true" distribution. DNWR and DRWR are estimated by the
Mixed Method of Moments. This method estimates the notional distribution that would prevail under flexibility,
assuming it follows a symmetric two-sided Weibull distribution. A comparison between the corrected factual
("true")  distribution  and  notional  distribution  gives  rise  to  the  measures  of  DNWR  and  DRWR.
19  The
procedure allows for different specifications for the mean and variance (across individuals) of the expected
bargaining focal point, ʌ
e.
20 Section 5.4 discusses the sensitivity of the results to the various restrictions that
can be placed on the mean and variance of ʌ
e. The method is parametric and assumes that wage changes
follow  a  Weibull  distribution.  As  in  Kahn  (1997),  or  Card  and  Hyslop  (1997),  the  method  relies  on  the
availability of a large employer-employee data set. However, it requires only one measure of wages and no
information on workers and company characteristics. The major drawback is that identification of DRWR and
DNWR becomes an issue in years with very low inflation, where the reference point for DRWR (ʌ
e) shifts
very close to the reference point for DNWR (zero).
In order to illustrate the procedure, Figure 2 reports for the year 2002 the histogram of earnings changes, the
factual or empirical distribution, together with the distribution corrected for measurement errors, i.e. the true
distribution, and the notional distribution that is assumed to hold in the fully flexible case. Note first that there
17 More specifically, we use the IWFP routine in its November 15, 2006 version.
18   The identification of the error distribution is based on the idea that a large wage increase followed by a negative wage
change in the next year, and vice versa, indicates the possibility of a measurement error. Since our annual earnings
typically combine two wage levels, this induces a positive correlation in wage changes in addition to the negative
correlation  caused  by  errors.  However,  similar  information  can  be  recovered  from  the  autocorrelation  of  higher
moments.
19   The model assumes that a fraction of the population is potentially subject to DRWR. If the notional wage change of
individuals subject to DRWR falls below their expected bargaining focal point, ʌ
e, they will receive a wage change
equal to ʌ
e instead of the notional wage change. Another portion of the population is assumed to be potentially
subject to DNWR. Such individuals with negative notional wage change, who are not subject to DRWR, will receive a
wage freeze instead of wage cut.
20 We use the "income procedure" that accounts for the fact that we proxy wages by annual earnings divided by annual
days worked. This is important because wage changes in Belgium are typically scattered over the entire year and
hence do not coincide with the end of the calendar year for which annual earnings are reported. For instance, if
someone's wage changes every year in May, then in the annual earnings data we would observe zero wage change
for this individual only if his or her wage did not change for two consecutive years.
  In sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, we allow the mean of ʌ
e to be unrestricted over the 0-4 percent band, and the variance
to range from 4E-06 to 3.6E-05.19
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spike at zero and the area of the histogram below and at zero. In the absence of DNWR, the simple measure
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e, and
part fall just above ʌ
e, this generates asymmetry in the distribution of price changes (see Figure A2 in the
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e is smaller than that above
2*median - ʌ
e. Assuming that the spike around ʌ
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e. The simple measure of DRWR again
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are few differences between the empirical and true distribution (in general, the empirical distribution has
heavier tails than the true distribution but there are less observations around the modal bin in the empirical
distribution).  This  suggests  that  measurement  errors  may  be  limited,  as  it  is  generally  the  case  with
administrative data. Second, there is no apparent spike at zero, consistent with the evidence in this paper
and findings of very low DNWR in Belgium in Dickens et al. (2006, 2007). Third, on the contrary, a mass of
observations that would have fallen below the estimated expected focal bargaining point (dashed line) ʌ
e, lie
above. Figure 2 also reports the indexation level I (solid line), and the "collective" wage increases, namely
the sum of automatic indexation and collectively agreed real wage increases (dash-dotted line). Note that, in
2002, the estimated focal bargaining point was very close to the indexation level.
Note: The solid vertical line shows the level of indexation, dashed line is at the expected bargaining focal point estimated
by the MMM procedure and finally the dash-dotted line shows the "collective" wage increases (as a result of automatic
indexation and collectively agreed real wage increases).
The method accounts for changes in the mean and dispersion of the distribution of earnings changes over
years and samples, as well as for changes in the bargaining focal point. Therefore, estimates of rigidity for
sub-samples do not necessarily average out to the estimate for the entire sample. In addition, although the
full automatic indexation makes real rigidity very strong, the estimated real rigidity may lie below 100 percent
for  two reasons. First, our  data refer to total earnings  rather than the base  wage. Second,  ʌ
e does  not
0
.05
Figure 2 - Wage change distribution, year 2002
Empirical distrib. (LHS bar) Theoretical distrib. (RHS bar) Notional distribution









This section presents our estimates of DRWR and DNWR for Belgium. First, we discuss the evolution of
wage  rigidity over  time.  Next,  we  evaluate  the  extent  of  real  and  nominal  rigidity for  different  groups  of
workers, defined according to occupation, age, and earnings level. Then, we assess differences across firm
types and firm situations. Firm types are defined according to size, employees turnover and training intensity.
Firm situations are defined according to real value added growth, profits and employment growth. Finally, we
consider robustness tests with alternative specifications, simple measures of rigidity and different definitions
of the firm situation.
5.1. DNWR and DRWR in Belgium
Figure 2 and the plots of distributions of earnings changes in Belgium  provided in the Appendix already
provide some indication of the degree of nominal and real wage rigidity. First, all the distributions are smooth
around zero without any spike, which suggests that nominal rigidity can play only a marginal role in Belgium.
Second, the empirical histograms are asymmetric with more observations in the upper tail than in the lower
tail, which might be an indication of real rigidity.
Figure 3 below reports the MMM measures of wage rigidity in Belgium for the period 1991-2002. Real rigidity
appears to be much more pervasive than nominal rigidity. On average, it is equal to 0.59, more than three
times higher than nominal rigidity (0.19). When compared to other industrialised countries participating in the
IWFP, Belgium becomes the country with the highest degree of DRWR, followed by France, Finland and
Sweden (see Dickens et al, 2006). On the other hand, nominal rigidity is very low, placing Belgium among
the countries with the lowest degree of DNWR. Such combination of high real wage rigidity and low nominal
rigidity stems from the specific institutional characteristics of Belgium, in particular full automatic indexation
that applies to most components of annual earnings, preventing strong and continuous falls in real earnings.21
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Real rigidity is relatively stable over time. Conversely, nominal wage rigidity shows two peak periods in 1995-
1996 and in 1999-2000. Excluding these two episodes, nominal rigidity would  be close to  zero (0.03 on
average). These two peaks should be treated with great caution because identification of nominal and real
rigidity becomes less accurate when the MMM estimates of the expected bargaining focal point, 3
e, are low.
This is the case in 1995-1996, and in 1999, where 3
e is below 0.02.
21
5.2. Wage rigidity across workers
Our results above suggest that Belgium is characterised by strong downward real wage rigidity and very low
nominal rigidity. Table 3 reports averages of nominal and real rigidity measures over the period 1991-2002
for different categories of workers. In general, DNWR is very low for all sub-categories of workers, except for
those with very low earnings. In some cases, the evolution of DNWR over time is unstable. For those two
motives, this section focuses primarily on the measures of DRWR. For the sake of brevity, we report only the
averages over the entire period. Note that estimates for each category may differ from the results for the
entire distribution.
22 Therefore, we focus our analysis on the relative degree of real earnings rigidity across
categories. As explained in Section 4.2, the estimates of DRWR do not necessarily take CPI inflation, or
indexation, as a reference point for computing real wages. The aim of the procedure is precisely to estimate
the expected inflation forecast used by agents in wage bargaining. Nevertheless, in order to have an idea of
how real wages evolve, we report in Table 3 the percentage of observations below indexation and below CPI
inflation.
23
21 Although the spike in 1995-1996 could be related to the episode of government intervention and wage moderation
(see  Section  2),  this  is  not  the  case  for  1999-2000.  Therefore  similar  increases  might be  due  to  measurement
problems rather than institutional changes.
22 First, the expected bargaining focal point from which real rigidity is computed may differ for each group. Second, the
distribution of wage changes and the estimated notional distribution differ in each exercise.
23   This provides a poor indicator of wage rigidity. Among others, it depends on the mean of the distribution. A shift in the
distribution of wage changes to the right will reduce the percentage of observations below inflation, even if the spike
of observations at expected inflation over the number of workers who should have received a real wage cut, i.e. the
simple measure of DRWR used in this paper, remains unchanged.
Table 3 - Downward real and nominal wage rigidity according to worker category (MMM measures)
MMM measures relative rigidity % of observations below
DRWR DNWR DRWR DNWR indexation CPI
entire sample 0.59 0.19
by job type % blue collar
blue-collar 0.55 0.10 1.00 1.00 27.3 30.2
white-collar 0.70 0.13 1.27 1.36 23.6 25.1
by age category % 18-25
18 age <25 0.65 0.22 1.00 1.00 19.5 20.8
25 age <35 0.58 0.13 0.89 0.59 22.2 23.9
35 age <45 0.56 0.15 0.85 0.69 26.0 28.1
45 age < 55 0.42 0.15 0.64 0.68 29.0 31.4
55 age <65 0.42 0.05 0.64 0.23 34.0 36.5
by earnings level % w<P15  % P15<w<P35
w < P15 0.62 0.64 0.65 1.00 26.1 28.8
P15 < w < P35 0.95 0.36 1.00 0.56 21.4 24.8
P35 < w < P65 0.78 0.30 0.82 0.47 23.7 26.3
P65 < w < P85 0.74 0.36 0.78 0.57 24.5 26.3
w > P85 0.60 0.15 0.63 0.23 26.6 27.8
by gender % men
men 0.62 0.08 1.00 0.50 25.8 27.8
women 0.62 0.16 1.00 1.00 22.7 24.5
Note:  “w”  stands  for  total  annual  earnings  per  working  days,  “Px” is the x
th percentile of the wage distribution. The
percentage of observations below indexation and CPI is calculated from the factual (empirical) distribution.
Earnings of white-collar workers are substantially more rigid than those of blue-collar workers. This holds
both for nominal and real rigidity and it is in line with predictions of all labour market theories discussed in
Section 3, with the exception of the contract theory. Firms may be reluctant to cut wages of workers whose
effort is less easily monitored or those with high replacement costs to avoid them reducing their effort or
leaving the firm. These characteristics are typical for white-collar workers. In addition, as white-collar workers
in Belgium obtain automatic wage increases with age or tenure, they are less likely to experience real cuts in
earnings,  as  compared  to  blue-collar  workers  who  typically do  not  have  such  assurance.  Our  finding  of
higher  DRWR  and  DNWR  for  white  collars  is  consistent  with  Campbell’s  (1997)  results.  Using
macroeconomic data for the US, he finds that wages of more skilled workers, and in particular white-collar
workers, are less responsive to fluctuations in unemployment. In addition, he reports evidence that wages of
more skilled workers adjust more rapidly to inflation.
Both real and nominal rigidity decline with age. Real rigidity is 35% lower for people over 45 than for the
youngest workers.
24 This finding is in line with the prediction of the shirking model and the adverse selection
model applied to quits. Because the cost of job loss is higher for older workers, and in particular for workers
over  45  years  old,  they  are  less  likely  to  quit  or  shirk,  even  if  their  earnings  increases  are  below  their
expected  bargaining  reference  point.  This  translates  into  lower  DRWR.  On  the  other  hand,  the  contract
theory, insider-outsider models and the firm-specific human capital model predict the opposite pattern of
24   The estimates of DRWR for the 45-55 and over 55 years categories are not so stable over time but they are always
below the remaining categories. We therefore consider these categories in our analysis.23
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over  45  years  old,  they  are  less  likely  to  quit  or  shirk,  even  if  their  earnings  increases  are  below  their
expected  bargaining  reference  point.  This  translates  into  lower  DRWR.  On  the  other  hand,  the  contract
theory, insider-outsider models and the firm-specific human capital model predict the opposite pattern of
24   The estimates of DRWR for the 45-55 and over 55 years categories are not so stable over time but they are always
below the remaining categories. We therefore consider these categories in our analysis.24
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rigidity.  As  short-term  contracts  are  more  frequent  for  younger  workers,  they  allow  for  larger  earning
variations  due  to  contract  renewals.  Furthermore,  if  mobility  across  employers  is  higher  among  younger
workers,  they  may  face  lower  DRWR  as  entrants/outsiders  have  less  bargaining  power  than
incumbents/insiders. Although these arguments are valid in general, they are not dominant in the data set.
In addition to these theoretical predictions, low rigidity observed for the oldest workers can also be related to
the fact that automatic increases due to age or tenure flatten out with age (see Figure 1). As a result, wage
changes  among  older  workers  are, ceteris  paribus,  lower  and  hence  more  susceptible  to  a  cut  in  real
earnings. In addition, as the extra-wage components of earnings become more important for people with
more experience and responsibilities, real decreases in total earnings could be more likely. At the other end
of the distribution scale, real and nominal rigidity is highest for the youngest workers. An extra reason for the
high level of nominal rigidity for the youngest category of workers is that wages are lower and thereby closer
to the minimum wage. This reflects the fact that there are more workers with very low education and poorly-
paid jobs in the lowest age category. Indeed, the fraction of workers with earnings exceeding the minimum
wage by at most 5 percent is 0.026 for people below 25 compared to around 0.0025 for the rest of the
sample.
A similar pattern is found across  earnings levels. We consider five earnings categories delimited by the
following percentiles of the earnings distribution: 15, 35, 65, 85. Because individual earnings depend on the
business  cycle  etc.,  we  calculate  the  percentiles  (and  earnings  categories)  separately  for  each  year.
25
Nominal rigidity is extremely high at the bottom of the earnings distribution, equal to 0.64, compared to the
average of 0.19 for the entire sample. Indeed, for workers with very low earnings close to the minimum
wage, nominal rigidity is more likely to bind. Another possible explanation is that the lowest earnings level
corresponds to more precarious and temporary jobs where the bargaining power of workers is much lower
and unions less well represented. Low earnings are indeed also characterised by a relatively low level of real
rigidity. Conversely, real wage rigidity is extremely high for workers in the second lowest wage category and
then decreases with earnings. As explained above, collectively-agreed wage changes can be relatively less
important for workers with high wages, making this category more flexible. The result may also be due to the
fact  that  total  earnings  for  better-paid  jobs  involve  a  much  larger  non-wage  component.  For  example,
bonuses and premiums, which are much more flexible over time than wages, are positively related to the
wage level. As shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, this leads to a higher dispersion of earnings changes; the
standard  deviation  of  earnings  changes  as  well  as  the  interdecile  range  are  respectively 50%  and  34%
higher for the top wage category than for the preceding one. This also translates into a larger fraction of
earnings changes below indexation, as shown in the last column of Table 3.
Men’s earnings exhibit the same degree of DRWR as women’s. This is in spite of the fact that women are
overrepresented in the lowest age category (14% of females versus 9% of males) and underrepresented
among the oldest workers in the data set (2.5% of females versus 6% of males). This disproportion would
25 Individual earnings are naturally related to tenure and age. Unfortunately estimating DRWR by age and earning
category would not be possible/not deliver accurate estimates because this would leave too few observations in
many categories. So we cannot disentangle the effect of age from the pure impact of wage level on DRWR.
suggest a higher degree of DRWR for women, all else equal. However, the composition of blue collars and
white  collars  among  women  works  in  the  opposite  direction,  predicting ceteris  paribus  lower  DRWR for
women  (more  than  83%  of  female  observations  in  the  sample  are  classified  as  blue-collar  workers,
compared to 52% of men).
To sum up, our evaluation of wage rigidity in Belgium indicates that the country is characterised primarily by
high real rigidity, as can be expected in a labour market with a full indexation mechanism. Real rigidity is
stronger for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. Real rigidity decreases with age, as non-wage
components of earnings may become more prominent with age or tenure. Except for very low earnings, it
decreases  with  the  earnings  level,  too;  due  to  a  larger  fraction  of  income  attributable  to  extra  wage
compensation such as bonuses and premiums. Very low earnings show a low degree of real rigidity; possibly
because  they correspond  to  more  temporary and  precarious  jobs  with  lower  bargaining  power.  Nominal
rigidity is essentially absent. However, nominal rigidity becomes binding in certain cases, such as very low
earnings  due  to their proximity to the minimum wage. The results are  in line  with the  predictions  of the
shirking model, the turnover model and the adverse selection model applied to job quits. Mixed evidence was
found for the insider-outsider theory and the firm-specific human capital model. Finally, the patterns found in
the data contradict the predictions of the contract theory.
5.3. Wage rigidity across firm types and situations
Table 4 reports the average real and nominal rigidity estimates for firm-specific categories. For this purpose,
we  merged  the  administrative  employer-employee  data  set  with  firms'  annual  accounts  in  order  to  add
variables like value added, profits and employment. As a result, the number of wage observations fell from
4.5  million  to  approximately  3  million  (depending  on  the  variable).
26  Since  1996,  firms  have  also  been
required to fill out the so-called social balance sheet, which includes information on, among other things,
flows of workers. So, wage rigidity for categories measuring quit rates and turnover can be estimated solely
for the years 1996-2002. For similar reasons as in Section 5.3, we focus our analysis on DRWR.
26   Almost  all  firms  in  Belgium  have  to  draw  up  annual  accounts  and  hence  the  coverage  is  virtually  exhaustive.
However, in some cases, no univocal relation could be made between social security employer identification and its
counterpart in the annual accounts. More importantly, some employers do not report annual accounts in the same
manner. This is the case, for instance, for bank and credit institutions.25
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rigidity.  As  short-term  contracts  are  more  frequent  for  younger  workers,  they  allow  for  larger  earning
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workers,  they  may  face  lower  DRWR  as  entrants/outsiders  have  less  bargaining  power  than
incumbents/insiders. Although these arguments are valid in general, they are not dominant in the data set.
In addition to these theoretical predictions, low rigidity observed for the oldest workers can also be related to
the fact that automatic increases due to age or tenure flatten out with age (see Figure 1). As a result, wage
changes  among  older  workers  are, ceteris  paribus,  lower  and  hence  more  susceptible  to  a  cut  in  real
earnings. In addition, as the extra-wage components of earnings become more important for people with
more experience and responsibilities, real decreases in total earnings could be more likely. At the other end
of the distribution scale, real and nominal rigidity is highest for the youngest workers. An extra reason for the
high level of nominal rigidity for the youngest category of workers is that wages are lower and thereby closer
to the minimum wage. This reflects the fact that there are more workers with very low education and poorly-
paid jobs in the lowest age category. Indeed, the fraction of workers with earnings exceeding the minimum
wage by at most 5 percent is 0.026 for people below 25 compared to around 0.0025 for the rest of the
sample.
A similar pattern is found across  earnings levels. We consider five earnings categories delimited by the
following percentiles of the earnings distribution: 15, 35, 65, 85. Because individual earnings depend on the
business  cycle  etc.,  we  calculate  the  percentiles  (and  earnings  categories)  separately  for  each  year.
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Nominal rigidity is extremely high at the bottom of the earnings distribution, equal to 0.64, compared to the
average of 0.19 for the entire sample. Indeed, for workers with very low earnings close to the minimum
wage, nominal rigidity is more likely to bind. Another possible explanation is that the lowest earnings level
corresponds to more precarious and temporary jobs where the bargaining power of workers is much lower
and unions less well represented. Low earnings are indeed also characterised by a relatively low level of real
rigidity. Conversely, real wage rigidity is extremely high for workers in the second lowest wage category and
then decreases with earnings. As explained above, collectively-agreed wage changes can be relatively less
important for workers with high wages, making this category more flexible. The result may also be due to the
fact  that  total  earnings  for  better-paid  jobs  involve  a  much  larger  non-wage  component.  For  example,
bonuses and premiums, which are much more flexible over time than wages, are positively related to the
wage level. As shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, this leads to a higher dispersion of earnings changes; the
standard  deviation  of  earnings  changes  as  well  as  the  interdecile  range  are  respectively 50%  and  34%
higher for the top wage category than for the preceding one. This also translates into a larger fraction of
earnings changes below indexation, as shown in the last column of Table 3.
Men’s earnings exhibit the same degree of DRWR as women’s. This is in spite of the fact that women are
overrepresented in the lowest age category (14% of females versus 9% of males) and underrepresented
among the oldest workers in the data set (2.5% of females versus 6% of males). This disproportion would
25 Individual earnings are naturally related to tenure and age. Unfortunately estimating DRWR by age and earning
category would not be possible/not deliver accurate estimates because this would leave too few observations in
many categories. So we cannot disentangle the effect of age from the pure impact of wage level on DRWR.
suggest a higher degree of DRWR for women, all else equal. However, the composition of blue collars and
white  collars  among  women  works  in  the  opposite  direction,  predicting ceteris  paribus  lower  DRWR for
women  (more  than  83%  of  female  observations  in  the  sample  are  classified  as  blue-collar  workers,
compared to 52% of men).
To sum up, our evaluation of wage rigidity in Belgium indicates that the country is characterised primarily by
high real rigidity, as can be expected in a labour market with a full indexation mechanism. Real rigidity is
stronger for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. Real rigidity decreases with age, as non-wage
components of earnings may become more prominent with age or tenure. Except for very low earnings, it
decreases  with  the  earnings  level,  too;  due  to  a  larger  fraction  of  income  attributable  to  extra  wage
compensation such as bonuses and premiums. Very low earnings show a low degree of real rigidity; possibly
because  they correspond  to  more  temporary and  precarious  jobs  with  lower  bargaining  power.  Nominal
rigidity is essentially absent. However, nominal rigidity becomes binding in certain cases, such as very low
earnings  due  to their proximity to the minimum wage. The results are  in line  with the  predictions  of the
shirking model, the turnover model and the adverse selection model applied to job quits. Mixed evidence was
found for the insider-outsider theory and the firm-specific human capital model. Finally, the patterns found in
the data contradict the predictions of the contract theory.
5.3. Wage rigidity across firm types and situations
Table 4 reports the average real and nominal rigidity estimates for firm-specific categories. For this purpose,
we  merged  the  administrative  employer-employee  data  set  with  firms'  annual  accounts  in  order  to  add
variables like value added, profits and employment. As a result, the number of wage observations fell from
4.5  million  to  approximately  3  million  (depending  on  the  variable).
26  Since  1996,  firms  have  also  been
required to fill out the so-called social balance sheet, which includes information on, among other things,
flows of workers. So, wage rigidity for categories measuring quit rates and turnover can be estimated solely
for the years 1996-2002. For similar reasons as in Section 5.3, we focus our analysis on DRWR.
26   Almost  all  firms  in  Belgium  have  to  draw  up  annual  accounts  and  hence  the  coverage  is  virtually  exhaustive.
However, in some cases, no univocal relation could be made between social security employer identification and its
counterpart in the annual accounts. More importantly, some employers do not report annual accounts in the same
manner. This is the case, for instance, for bank and credit institutions.26
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Table 4 - Downward real and nominal rigidity at the level of firm categories (MMM measures)
MMM measures relative rigidity % of observations below
DRWR DNWR   DRWR  DNWR indexation CPI
entire sample 0.59 0.19
by size % 25 employees
25 employees 0.78 0.12 1.00 1.00 25.6 28.5
26-50 employees 0.70 0.12 0.90 1.02 25.2 27.8
51-100 employees 0.72 0.08 0.93 0.70 24.5 26.7
101-500 employees 0.62 0.02 0.80 0.14 24.4 26.2
>500 employees 0.44 0.21 0.57 1.85 24.2 25.8
by quit rate % no quit rate
very low or zero quit rate 0.72 0.17 1.00 1.00 26.4 26.8
low quit rate 0.70 0.09 0.97 0.50 25.3 27.1
medium quit rate 0.70 0.07 0.98 0.39 27.6 29.5
high quit rate 0.57 0.12 0.79 0.71 31.1 32.8
by real value added growth % expansion
'log(va)t>0 0.67 0.07 1.00 1.00 23.3 25.3
'log(va)t<0 0.61 0.13 0.91 1.86 25.8 28.0
by profits % expansion
3t>0 0.62 0.10 1.00 1.00 23.8 25.9
3t<0 0.53 0.09 0.85 0.91 27.8 29.8
by employment growth % expansion
'log(L)t>0 0.68 0.11 1.00 1.00 23.3 25.4
'log(L)t<0 0.55 0.12 0.81 1.09 25.9 28.0
by employment growth and turnover % high turnover
low turnover 'L<0 0.55 0.18 0.90 3.26 26.6 28.4
high turnover 'L<0 0.61 0.05 1.00 1.00 29.4 31.2
Note: Averages for quit rate and volatility categories are based on estimates over 1996-2002. The entire sample includes
estimates  for  1991-2002.  The  percentage  of  observations  below  indexation  and  CPI  is  calculated  from  the  factual
(empirical) distribution.
We first examine differences across firms of different size classes, as measured by the number of employees
at the end of the year.
27 DRWR is lower for very large firms and much higher for very small firms (below 25
employees). Very large firms usually have firm-level collective wage agreements. These agreements provide
a wage cushion above the sector-level agreement, which enhances wage flexibility.
28 In general, large firms
also  have  a  more  complex  compensation  policy,  with  more  variable  and  therefore  flexible  extra-wage
components. On the other hand, very small firms may be start-up businesses that cannot afford high wages
and big wage rises, as can be seen in Tables A3 and A4. Smaller firms are therefore closer to the DRWR
bound.
Next,  we analyse differences  in quit rates across  firms. The turnover model implies that firms with high
turnover costs will try to stabilise their workforce by minimising fluctuations in employees' earnings, in order
to save on training and hiring costs. High turnover costs would thus imply low quit rates and a high degree of
27   Note  that  the  definition  of  the  number  of  employees  in  the  balance  sheet  has  changed  over  the  period  under
examination. Since 1996 (and in some case 1997), firms report the total number of employees at the end of the year.
Before  1996,  only  information  on  the  average  number  of  employees  per  year  is  available.  The  break  in  the
employment series, however, does not seem to have any substantial impact on the MMM estimates of wage rigidity.
28   As shown in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix, average daily earnings in our sample are lower and less widely
dispersed for firms with fewer than 25 employees (about 75 euros on average with a standard deviation of 32.31)
than for firms with more than 500 employees (105 euros on average with a standard deviation of 46.70). Further
earnings changes are lower for smaller firms than for larger firms (0.042 for firms with less than 25 employees against
0.049 for firms with more than 500 employees).
rigidity, all else equal. To examine this question, quit rates are defined as the total number of exits divided by
the  number  of  employees  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  (both  in  full-time  equivalent).
29  We  define  four
categories of quit rates. The first consists of firms with quit rates below 5 percent.
30 The others are delimited
by the 33rd and 66th percentiles of the distribution of quit rates across firms, excluding zero quit rates. Our
estimates show that firms with the lowest or zero quit rate exhibit 20% higher DRWR than firms with the
highest  quit  rates.
31  In  addition,  statistics  reported  in  Table  A4  indicate  that  the  standard  deviation  of
earnings changes is larger for firms with high quit rates (0.11) than for firms with low or medium quit rates
(0.08 and 0.09 respectively). This supports the view that employees tend to leave their jobs less frequently
when their wages are more downwardly rigid. Therefore, firms with higher turnover costs should avoid (real)
wage cuts in order to reduce (costly) quits. Our findings are in line with the predictions of the turnover model.
Finally, we investigate whether the high degree of real rigidity observed for Belgian firms is restricting their
ability to cut wages under unfavourable conditions. An expanding firm can afford real wage increases or
might be forced to raise wages if the labour market is tight. On the other hand, a contracting firm primarily
tries  to  cut  costs.  According  to  the  legislation  on  restructuring  companies,  firms  have  to  follow  strict
procedures and interact with unions and local authorities when they want to cut costs through collective lay-
offs. Employees in shrinking firms may be more likely to accept wage cuts as they fear that they could be
fired in the next round of dismissals. This implies a lower degree of wage rigidity. One should also note that,
since annual earnings include overtime hours paid, we may observe a decline in earnings due to a reduction
in hours worked in adverse times.
We have experimented with several variables indicating the situation of a firm - real value added growth,
profits and employment growth. We define "good times" as a situation in which real value added growth is
positive, profits are positive or employment growth is positive.
32 In Table 4, we present the results based on
this decomposition when the indicator is defined with respect to year t, i.e. when value added, for example,
decreases within the course of year t. Table 6 in the next section presents robustness results with respect to
two alternative definitions of good and bad times. The first indicator is based on one-period lagged values of
value added, profits  and employment.
33 The last indicator considers the cumulative sum  of growth rates
between year t and year t-1.
34 Profits are measured as operating profits and employment is defined as the
total number of employees at the end of the year.
29 Firms with more quits than the number of employees at the beginning of the year plus the number of entries are
excluded from the data set.
30   This attempts to control for the fact that small companies are more likely to observe zero quits than large companies,
all else equal.
31 This cannot be attributed to the fact that quit rates proxy for firm size. Indeed, higher quit rates are observed for
smaller firms and vice versa. Our findings indicate that DRWR is lower for larger firms and for firms with higher quit
rates.
32   Value added growth and employment growth are negative in 40% to 45% of the observations. Profits are negative in
around  18%  of  the  cases.  For  large  firms,  nominal  value  added  is  equal  to  operating  income  minus  operating
subsidies and compensatory amounts received from public authorities, and the following operating charges: raw
materials consumables and services and other goods. For small firms, valued added is proxied by gross operating
margin. It is deflated using the 2-digit NACE deflator for value added.
33  If, for example, value added shocks occur at the end of year t-1, while wages are adjusted during year t, it is more
relevant to consider this lagged indicator.
34   Such an indicator aims to capture shocks with longer-lasting effects, or shocks that are large enough to compensate
for possible previous (exceptionally) good outcomes.27
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Table 4 - Downward real and nominal rigidity at the level of firm categories (MMM measures)
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by employment growth and turnover % high turnover
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high turnover 'L<0 0.61 0.05 1.00 1.00 29.4 31.2
Note: Averages for quit rate and volatility categories are based on estimates over 1996-2002. The entire sample includes
estimates  for  1991-2002.  The  percentage  of  observations  below  indexation  and  CPI  is  calculated  from  the  factual
(empirical) distribution.
We first examine differences across firms of different size classes, as measured by the number of employees
at the end of the year.
27 DRWR is lower for very large firms and much higher for very small firms (below 25
employees). Very large firms usually have firm-level collective wage agreements. These agreements provide
a wage cushion above the sector-level agreement, which enhances wage flexibility.
28 In general, large firms
also  have  a  more  complex  compensation  policy,  with  more  variable  and  therefore  flexible  extra-wage
components. On the other hand, very small firms may be start-up businesses that cannot afford high wages
and big wage rises, as can be seen in Tables A3 and A4. Smaller firms are therefore closer to the DRWR
bound.
Next,  we analyse differences  in quit rates across  firms. The turnover model implies that firms with high
turnover costs will try to stabilise their workforce by minimising fluctuations in employees' earnings, in order
to save on training and hiring costs. High turnover costs would thus imply low quit rates and a high degree of
27   Note  that  the  definition  of  the  number  of  employees  in  the  balance  sheet  has  changed  over  the  period  under
examination. Since 1996 (and in some case 1997), firms report the total number of employees at the end of the year.
Before  1996,  only  information  on  the  average  number  of  employees  per  year  is  available.  The  break  in  the
employment series, however, does not seem to have any substantial impact on the MMM estimates of wage rigidity.
28   As shown in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix, average daily earnings in our sample are lower and less widely
dispersed for firms with fewer than 25 employees (about 75 euros on average with a standard deviation of 32.31)
than for firms with more than 500 employees (105 euros on average with a standard deviation of 46.70). Further
earnings changes are lower for smaller firms than for larger firms (0.042 for firms with less than 25 employees against
0.049 for firms with more than 500 employees).
rigidity, all else equal. To examine this question, quit rates are defined as the total number of exits divided by
the  number  of  employees  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  (both  in  full-time  equivalent).
29  We  define  four
categories of quit rates. The first consists of firms with quit rates below 5 percent.
30 The others are delimited
by the 33rd and 66th percentiles of the distribution of quit rates across firms, excluding zero quit rates. Our
estimates show that firms with the lowest or zero quit rate exhibit 20% higher DRWR than firms with the
highest  quit  rates.
31  In  addition,  statistics  reported  in  Table  A4  indicate  that  the  standard  deviation  of
earnings changes is larger for firms with high quit rates (0.11) than for firms with low or medium quit rates
(0.08 and 0.09 respectively). This supports the view that employees tend to leave their jobs less frequently
when their wages are more downwardly rigid. Therefore, firms with higher turnover costs should avoid (real)
wage cuts in order to reduce (costly) quits. Our findings are in line with the predictions of the turnover model.
Finally, we investigate whether the high degree of real rigidity observed for Belgian firms is restricting their
ability to cut wages under unfavourable conditions. An expanding firm can afford real wage increases or
might be forced to raise wages if the labour market is tight. On the other hand, a contracting firm primarily
tries  to  cut  costs.  According  to  the  legislation  on  restructuring  companies,  firms  have  to  follow  strict
procedures and interact with unions and local authorities when they want to cut costs through collective lay-
offs. Employees in shrinking firms may be more likely to accept wage cuts as they fear that they could be
fired in the next round of dismissals. This implies a lower degree of wage rigidity. One should also note that,
since annual earnings include overtime hours paid, we may observe a decline in earnings due to a reduction
in hours worked in adverse times.
We have experimented with several variables indicating the situation of a firm - real value added growth,
profits and employment growth. We define "good times" as a situation in which real value added growth is
positive, profits are positive or employment growth is positive.
32 In Table 4, we present the results based on
this decomposition when the indicator is defined with respect to year t, i.e. when value added, for example,
decreases within the course of year t. Table 6 in the next section presents robustness results with respect to
two alternative definitions of good and bad times. The first indicator is based on one-period lagged values of
value added, profits  and employment.
33 The last indicator considers the cumulative sum  of growth rates
between year t and year t-1.
34 Profits are measured as operating profits and employment is defined as the
total number of employees at the end of the year.
29 Firms with more quits than the number of employees at the beginning of the year plus the number of entries are
excluded from the data set.
30   This attempts to control for the fact that small companies are more likely to observe zero quits than large companies,
all else equal.
31 This cannot be attributed to the fact that quit rates proxy for firm size. Indeed, higher quit rates are observed for
smaller firms and vice versa. Our findings indicate that DRWR is lower for larger firms and for firms with higher quit
rates.
32   Value added growth and employment growth are negative in 40% to 45% of the observations. Profits are negative in
around  18%  of  the  cases.  For  large  firms,  nominal  value  added  is  equal  to  operating  income  minus  operating
subsidies and compensatory amounts received from public authorities, and the following operating charges: raw
materials consumables and services and other goods. For small firms, valued added is proxied by gross operating
margin. It is deflated using the 2-digit NACE deflator for value added.
33  If, for example, value added shocks occur at the end of year t-1, while wages are adjusted during year t, it is more
relevant to consider this lagged indicator.
34   Such an indicator aims to capture shocks with longer-lasting effects, or shocks that are large enough to compensate
for possible previous (exceptionally) good outcomes.28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 840
December 2007
Because the analysis is based on sample splits, we cannot control for sector- or time-specific effects, e.g. by
using dummy variables. Therefore, downturns as identified in this paper may capture aggregate business
cycle shocks, sector-specific downturns as well as a firm-specific adverse times.
35 If all firms in the same
sector were expanding at the same time, labour market tightness could induce stronger wage increases and
less or no  wage decrease, which could imply a lower degree of  downward wage rigidity. Except for the
energy industry with only 5 firms, there is no other sector in which all firms are in downturn or upturn at the
same time. Nor are all firms in downturn or upturn in the same year. Below, we also report robustness with
another definition of adverse economic conditions that attempts to control for sector-specific conditions. We
consider the sample of firms for which value added growth is larger than the sector-specific median, where
the sector is defined at the NACE-2 level. Results reported in Table 6 are of the same order of magnitude.
The  results,  presented  in  Table  4,  univocally  conclude  that  observed  DRWR  is  lower  when  firms  face
adverse economic conditions. Firms with declining value added, negative profits or reduced employment
exhibit lower degrees of estimated real rigidity.
36 This result is robust to alternative definitions of adverse
situations and to alternative measures of real rigidity (see the next section). It suggests that cuts in real
earnings are more likely in bad times. This may occur because workers accept wage moderation or because
firms are able to reduce the extra  wage components  of earnings, like bonuses, premiums  and overtime
hours, when the situation takes a turn for the worse. Indeed, there is usually some form of wage moderation
in bad times (wage growth is around 4.5% in bad times against 4.9% in good times, as shown in Table A4).
Furthermore, a higher fraction of workers experience a decline in real earnings, as shown in the last column
of  Table  4.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Carneiro  and  Portugal  (2006)  that  workers
accept wage concessions as the probability of firm closure increases.
37 We examine this question in more
detail and split the sample of firms with declining employment into those with a high turnover rate and those
with a low turnover rate. Turnover is defined by the sum of entries and exits over the average number of
employees  in  the  previous  year  (all  variables  in  full-time  equivalent).  Our  estimates  suggest  that  when
employment  declines,  DRWR  is  lower  the  smaller  the  turnover.  This  suggests  that  if  firms  do  not  cut
employment to a large extent, they may reduce their labour costs through higher earnings concessions from
their employees.
All in all, our findings suggest that observed DRWR may fluctuate according to economic conditions. Small
firms experience stronger downward real wage rigidity than large firms. Our results suggest that firms with
35 Indeed, if we compute the percentage of firms in upturn, weighted by their value added, we find a correlation of
around 70 percent between that measure and the business cycle index computed by the National Bank of Belgium
from its business cycle survey for the manufacturing and construction sectors. These are also strongly correlated with
the aggregate business cycle index.
  Furthermore, regressing the percentage of firms in downturns by NACE-2 sector on time and industry dummies, the
R² amounts to 0.32 for time dummies and 0.14 for industry dummies. So, we cannot rule out that our measure of
downturns is a mix of aggregate sector- and firm-specific economic conditions.
36 This result is independent of the size of the firm. For example, numbers not reported for the sake of brevity show that
smaller firms (with less than 25 employees) experienced real value added declines more frequently, but employment
reductions less frequently.
37 They also find that firms experiencing a decline in sales growth and smaller firms and high-paying firms are more
likely to close.
low quit rates are characterised by stronger real rigidity. Finally, real wage rigidity is lower when the firm
faces adverse economic conditions. One observes more (real) earnings cuts when real value added growth,
employment  growth  or  profits  are  negative.  The  effects  are  even  stronger  for  firms  with  low  turnover,
suggesting  that  wage  cuts  may  substitute  for  job  cuts  when  the  firm‘s  situation  deteriorates.  Note  that
although the degree of real rigidity declines for firms that have an incentive to cut wages, the absolute level
of real wage rigidity remains high from a cross-country comparison (see Dickens et al., 2006).
5.4. Robustness analysis
This section provides robustness tests of the above findings along three lines. First, we consider alternative
specifications for the MMM estimates of DRWR and DNWR. Second, we evaluate the robustness of our
conclusion with respect to simple measures of rigidity as described in Section 4. Third, we also examine the
sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative definitions of adverse economic situations.
The  MMM  procedure  assumes  that  the  bargaining  focal  point, 3
e,  is  normally  distributed.  Alternative
specifications  provide  different  bounds  for  the  grid  search  for  its  mean  and/or  variance.  In  the  above
analysis, we allow the unrestricted mean to range from 0 to 4 percent
38, and the restricted variance to take
values between 4E-06 and 3.6E-05. When the mean is restricted,  we limit the grid search for  expected
inflation forecasts to a minimum width of 0.015, and to include realised CPI inflation, its one-period lagged
value, a within-sample AR(1) forecast of CPI inflation and the official forecast for CPI inflation produced by
the Federal Planning Bureau.
39 In the specification with unrestricted variance of 3
e, the variance can take
any value between 4E-06 and 0.1.
Examining the estimates of rigidity year by year gives a better view of the differences across the four MMM
specifications. Figure 4 documents that the DNWR and DRWR estimates differ substantially from each other
in  three  instances  –  the  initial  observation  (year  1991)  and  the  periods  1995-1996  and  1999-2000.  As
baseline model we chose the restriction that provides in our opinion the best description of the three periods
under consideration. The years 1995, 1996 and 1999 are characterised by a very low average bargaining
focal  point  (3
e)  which  might  pose  problems  for  identifying  DNWR  and  DRWR.  The  Belgian  government
directly intervened in the labour market in the years 1995-1996, causing wage moderation and a real wage
freeze. However, there is nothing that would justify a big variation in DNWR or DRWR from the year 1995 to
1996. This condition is satisfied only by the specification which restricts the variance of 3
e but not its mean
(see Figure 4). It picks up the episode of wage moderation in 1995-1996 as an increase in nominal rigidity.
When restricting both the mean and variance of 3
e, nominal rigidity peaks in 1996 alone. In the specification
where both the mean and variance are unrestricted, real rigidity peaks in 1995-1996 and nominal rigidity
38 The original procedure allows the grid search to go up to 10 percent. For efficiency, we limit the range to the 0-4
percent band, which is much more realistic in view of the inflation rates seen over the 1990-2002 period. In fact, CPI
inflation ranged from 0.010 to 0.031 over the period.
39  With respect to the  original IWFP procedure, we impose the additional criterion that the range for the mean of
expected inflation forecasts includes the official forecast of the CPI inflation prepared by the Federal Planning Bureau
(FPB), that is used in the collective bargaining by the social partners. Further, we extend the band around its mean
so that its width is at least 1.5 percentage points. Otherwise, the band would have become very narrow in some years
as compared to other years.29
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Because the analysis is based on sample splits, we cannot control for sector- or time-specific effects, e.g. by
using dummy variables. Therefore, downturns as identified in this paper may capture aggregate business
cycle shocks, sector-specific downturns as well as a firm-specific adverse times.
35 If all firms in the same
sector were expanding at the same time, labour market tightness could induce stronger wage increases and
less or no  wage decrease, which could imply a lower degree of  downward wage rigidity. Except for the
energy industry with only 5 firms, there is no other sector in which all firms are in downturn or upturn at the
same time. Nor are all firms in downturn or upturn in the same year. Below, we also report robustness with
another definition of adverse economic conditions that attempts to control for sector-specific conditions. We
consider the sample of firms for which value added growth is larger than the sector-specific median, where
the sector is defined at the NACE-2 level. Results reported in Table 6 are of the same order of magnitude.
The  results,  presented  in  Table  4,  univocally  conclude  that  observed  DRWR  is  lower  when  firms  face
adverse economic conditions. Firms with declining value added, negative profits or reduced employment
exhibit lower degrees of estimated real rigidity.
36 This result is robust to alternative definitions of adverse
situations and to alternative measures of real rigidity (see the next section). It suggests that cuts in real
earnings are more likely in bad times. This may occur because workers accept wage moderation or because
firms are able to reduce the extra  wage components  of earnings, like bonuses, premiums  and overtime
hours, when the situation takes a turn for the worse. Indeed, there is usually some form of wage moderation
in bad times (wage growth is around 4.5% in bad times against 4.9% in good times, as shown in Table A4).
Furthermore, a higher fraction of workers experience a decline in real earnings, as shown in the last column
of  Table  4.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Carneiro  and  Portugal  (2006)  that  workers
accept wage concessions as the probability of firm closure increases.
37 We examine this question in more
detail and split the sample of firms with declining employment into those with a high turnover rate and those
with a low turnover rate. Turnover is defined by the sum of entries and exits over the average number of
employees  in  the  previous  year  (all  variables  in  full-time  equivalent).  Our  estimates  suggest  that  when
employment  declines,  DRWR  is  lower  the  smaller  the  turnover.  This  suggests  that  if  firms  do  not  cut
employment to a large extent, they may reduce their labour costs through higher earnings concessions from
their employees.
All in all, our findings suggest that observed DRWR may fluctuate according to economic conditions. Small
firms experience stronger downward real wage rigidity than large firms. Our results suggest that firms with
35 Indeed, if we compute the percentage of firms in upturn, weighted by their value added, we find a correlation of
around 70 percent between that measure and the business cycle index computed by the National Bank of Belgium
from its business cycle survey for the manufacturing and construction sectors. These are also strongly correlated with
the aggregate business cycle index.
  Furthermore, regressing the percentage of firms in downturns by NACE-2 sector on time and industry dummies, the
R² amounts to 0.32 for time dummies and 0.14 for industry dummies. So, we cannot rule out that our measure of
downturns is a mix of aggregate sector- and firm-specific economic conditions.
36 This result is independent of the size of the firm. For example, numbers not reported for the sake of brevity show that
smaller firms (with less than 25 employees) experienced real value added declines more frequently, but employment
reductions less frequently.
37 They also find that firms experiencing a decline in sales growth and smaller firms and high-paying firms are more
likely to close.
low quit rates are characterised by stronger real rigidity. Finally, real wage rigidity is lower when the firm
faces adverse economic conditions. One observes more (real) earnings cuts when real value added growth,
employment  growth  or  profits  are  negative.  The  effects  are  even  stronger  for  firms  with  low  turnover,
suggesting  that  wage  cuts  may  substitute  for  job  cuts  when  the  firm‘s  situation  deteriorates.  Note  that
although the degree of real rigidity declines for firms that have an incentive to cut wages, the absolute level
of real wage rigidity remains high from a cross-country comparison (see Dickens et al., 2006).
5.4. Robustness analysis
This section provides robustness tests of the above findings along three lines. First, we consider alternative
specifications for the MMM estimates of DRWR and DNWR. Second, we evaluate the robustness of our
conclusion with respect to simple measures of rigidity as described in Section 4. Third, we also examine the
sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative definitions of adverse economic situations.
The  MMM  procedure  assumes  that  the  bargaining  focal  point, 3
e,  is  normally  distributed.  Alternative
specifications  provide  different  bounds  for  the  grid  search  for  its  mean  and/or  variance.  In  the  above
analysis, we allow the unrestricted mean to range from 0 to 4 percent
38, and the restricted variance to take
values between 4E-06 and 3.6E-05. When the mean is restricted,  we limit the grid search for  expected
inflation forecasts to a minimum width of 0.015, and to include realised CPI inflation, its one-period lagged
value, a within-sample AR(1) forecast of CPI inflation and the official forecast for CPI inflation produced by
the Federal Planning Bureau.
39 In the specification with unrestricted variance of 3
e, the variance can take
any value between 4E-06 and 0.1.
Examining the estimates of rigidity year by year gives a better view of the differences across the four MMM
specifications. Figure 4 documents that the DNWR and DRWR estimates differ substantially from each other
in  three  instances  –  the  initial  observation  (year  1991)  and  the  periods  1995-1996  and  1999-2000.  As
baseline model we chose the restriction that provides in our opinion the best description of the three periods
under consideration. The years 1995, 1996 and 1999 are characterised by a very low average bargaining
focal  point  (3
e)  which  might  pose  problems  for  identifying  DNWR  and  DRWR.  The  Belgian  government
directly intervened in the labour market in the years 1995-1996, causing wage moderation and a real wage
freeze. However, there is nothing that would justify a big variation in DNWR or DRWR from the year 1995 to
1996. This condition is satisfied only by the specification which restricts the variance of 3
e but not its mean
(see Figure 4). It picks up the episode of wage moderation in 1995-1996 as an increase in nominal rigidity.
When restricting both the mean and variance of 3
e, nominal rigidity peaks in 1996 alone. In the specification
where both the mean and variance are unrestricted, real rigidity peaks in 1995-1996 and nominal rigidity
38 The original procedure allows the grid search to go up to 10 percent. For efficiency, we limit the range to the 0-4
percent band, which is much more realistic in view of the inflation rates seen over the 1990-2002 period. In fact, CPI
inflation ranged from 0.010 to 0.031 over the period.
39  With respect to the  original IWFP procedure, we impose the additional criterion that the range for the mean of
expected inflation forecasts includes the official forecast of the CPI inflation prepared by the Federal Planning Bureau
(FPB), that is used in the collective bargaining by the social partners. Further, we extend the band around its mean
so that its width is at least 1.5 percentage points. Otherwise, the band would have become very narrow in some years
as compared to other years.30
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peaks only in 1996. When only the mean of 3
e is restricted, this induces an increase in real rigidity in 1995.
Therefore, we think that the specification with restricted variance and unrestricted mean of 3
e provides the
most consistent view and we used it as our preferred specification in the previous section.
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(4.b) MMM estimates of DNWR
Note: Restrictions with respect to the mean and variance of the bargaining focal point (3
e).
Table 5 compares the average estimates of DNWR and DRWR for the four alternative MMM specifications
together with the simple measures of Dickens et al. (2007) described in Section 4 and illustrated in Figures
A1  and  A2  in  the  Appendix.  Simple  true  measures  are  based  on  the  distribution  of  earnings  changes
corrected for measurement errors, i.e. the  "true" distribution. Simple empirical  measures  are constructed
from the factual (uncorrected) distribution. In all five specifications, real wage rigidity is much stronger than
nominal rigidity. Real rigidity is around 60 percent in all cases, except for simple empirical cases where it falls
to 0.49.









real rigidity 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.49
nominal rigidity 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.05
For the entire sample, results with restricted variance, and restricted mean and variance lead to the most
sensible findings. For these two specifications, our assessments of relative wage rigidity across groups are
also consistent. Our quantitative evaluation of real rigidity for the various groups is very close in the two
methods;  discrepancies  appear  to  be  stronger  for  nominal  rigidities.  Our  qualitative  conclusions  are
unaffected: real and nominal rigidity are stronger for white collars, and they decrease with age and wage
level. Nominal rigidity is the strongest for very low wages and younger workers. Nominal and real rigidity are
low for very high wages. Estimated real rigidity decreases in bad times. The same conclusions hold if one
considers simple measures of rigidity, except for the case of  declining employment and low versus  high
employment turnover.











DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR
entire sample 0.59 0.19      0.61 0.15      0.49 0.05      0.62 0.06
by job type
blue-collar 0.55 0.10    0.55 0.04    0.31 0.06    0.40 0.08
white-collar 0.70 0.13      0.63 0.14      0.55 0.04      0.71 0.06
by age category
18 age <25 0.65 0.22    0.67 0.13    0.70 0.04    0.85 0.05
25 age  <35 0.58 0.13    0.63 0.10    0.60 0.05    0.71 0.06
35 age <45 0.56 0.15    0.58 0.10    0.42 0.05    0.57 0.07
45 age < 55 0.42 0.15    0.45 0.08    0.25 0.05    0.36 0.08
55 age <65 0.42 0.05    0.40 0.17    0.17 0.05    0.24 0.08
by wage category
w < P15 0.62 0.64    0.67 0.66    0.39 0.08    0.65 0.12
P15< w < P35 0.95 0.36    0.96 0.35    0.55 0.08    0.82 0.13
P35< w < P65 0.78 0.30    0.71 0.24    0.51 0.06    0.77 0.09
P65< w < P80 0.74 0.36    0.75 0.19    0.45 0.06    0.72 0.11
P80< w 0.60 0.15    0.51 0.20    0.39 0.04    0.57 0.07
by gender
men 0.62 0.08    0.60 0.09    0.47 0.05    0.58 0.07
women 0.62 0.16    0.63 0.14    0.57 0.05    0.69 0.06
Note: “w” stands for total annual earnings per working days, “Px” is the x
th percentile of the wage distribution. The entire
sample includes estimates for 1991-2002. Our baseline specification in Section 5.2 is restricted variance and unrestricted
mean of 3
e.
Finally, Table 6 also considers alternative definitions of adverse economic situations. We consider both the
current and lagged situation, to account for the fact that the change in value added, employment or profits
might  first  be  observed  at  the  end  of  the  year.  We  also  consider  the  cumulated  sum  of  value  added
(employment) over two consecutive years so as to take into account longer-lasting effects. This also ensures
that we do not consider as an adverse time a situation where value added (employment) falls in time t-131
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peaks only in 1996. When only the mean of 3
e is restricted, this induces an increase in real rigidity in 1995.
Therefore, we think that the specification with restricted variance and unrestricted mean of 3
e provides the
most consistent view and we used it as our preferred specification in the previous section.
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(4.b) MMM estimates of DNWR
Note: Restrictions with respect to the mean and variance of the bargaining focal point (3
e).
Table 5 compares the average estimates of DNWR and DRWR for the four alternative MMM specifications
together with the simple measures of Dickens et al. (2007) described in Section 4 and illustrated in Figures
A1  and  A2  in  the  Appendix.  Simple  true  measures  are  based  on  the  distribution  of  earnings  changes
corrected for measurement errors, i.e. the  "true" distribution. Simple empirical  measures  are constructed
from the factual (uncorrected) distribution. In all five specifications, real wage rigidity is much stronger than
nominal rigidity. Real rigidity is around 60 percent in all cases, except for simple empirical cases where it falls
to 0.49.









real rigidity 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.49
nominal rigidity 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.05
For the entire sample, results with restricted variance, and restricted mean and variance lead to the most
sensible findings. For these two specifications, our assessments of relative wage rigidity across groups are
also consistent. Our quantitative evaluation of real rigidity for the various groups is very close in the two
methods;  discrepancies  appear  to  be  stronger  for  nominal  rigidities.  Our  qualitative  conclusions  are
unaffected: real and nominal rigidity are stronger for white collars, and they decrease with age and wage
level. Nominal rigidity is the strongest for very low wages and younger workers. Nominal and real rigidity are
low for very high wages. Estimated real rigidity decreases in bad times. The same conclusions hold if one
considers simple measures of rigidity, except for the case of  declining employment and low versus  high
employment turnover.











DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR
entire sample 0.59 0.19      0.61 0.15      0.49 0.05      0.62 0.06
by job type
blue-collar 0.55 0.10    0.55 0.04    0.31 0.06    0.40 0.08
white-collar 0.70 0.13      0.63 0.14      0.55 0.04      0.71 0.06
by age category
18 age <25 0.65 0.22    0.67 0.13    0.70 0.04    0.85 0.05
25 age  <35 0.58 0.13    0.63 0.10    0.60 0.05    0.71 0.06
35 age <45 0.56 0.15    0.58 0.10    0.42 0.05    0.57 0.07
45 age < 55 0.42 0.15    0.45 0.08    0.25 0.05    0.36 0.08
55 age <65 0.42 0.05    0.40 0.17    0.17 0.05    0.24 0.08
by wage category
w < P15 0.62 0.64    0.67 0.66    0.39 0.08    0.65 0.12
P15< w < P35 0.95 0.36    0.96 0.35    0.55 0.08    0.82 0.13
P35< w < P65 0.78 0.30    0.71 0.24    0.51 0.06    0.77 0.09
P65< w < P80 0.74 0.36    0.75 0.19    0.45 0.06    0.72 0.11
P80< w 0.60 0.15    0.51 0.20    0.39 0.04    0.57 0.07
by gender
men 0.62 0.08    0.60 0.09    0.47 0.05    0.58 0.07
women 0.62 0.16    0.63 0.14    0.57 0.05    0.69 0.06
Note: “w” stands for total annual earnings per working days, “Px” is the x
th percentile of the wage distribution. The entire
sample includes estimates for 1991-2002. Our baseline specification in Section 5.2 is restricted variance and unrestricted
mean of 3
e.
Finally, Table 6 also considers alternative definitions of adverse economic situations. We consider both the
current and lagged situation, to account for the fact that the change in value added, employment or profits
might  first  be  observed  at  the  end  of  the  year.  We  also  consider  the  cumulated  sum  of  value  added
(employment) over two consecutive years so as to take into account longer-lasting effects. This also ensures
that we do not consider as an adverse time a situation where value added (employment) falls in time t-132
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following a large increase in t, so that the current level can be considered as normal. Lastly, in order to take
into account sector-specific business cycle conditions, we consider value added growth relative to the sector
median. Whatever the indicator and measure of rigidity considered, DRWR is always lower in adverse times.











DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR
entire sample 0.59 0.19      0.61 0.15      0.49 0.05      0.62 0.06
by size
 25 employees 0.78 0.12    0.79 0.11    0.47 0.05    0.58 0.07
26-50 employees 0.70 0.12    0.70 0.09    0.52 0.05    0.61 0.06
51-100 employees 0.72 0.08    0.74 0.07    0.59 0.04    0.73 0.05
101-500 employees 0.62 0.02    0.59 0.07    0.50 0.05    0.65 0.06
>500 employees 0.44 0.21    0.41 0.23    0.41 0.05    0.54 0.07
by quit rate
very low or zero quit
rate 0.72 0.17    0.72 0.11    0.59 0.07    0.66 0.08
low quit rate 0.70 0.09    0.68 0.07    0.57 0.05    0.73 0.08
medium quit rate 0.70 0.07    0.71 0.06    0.52 0.05    0.62 0.06
high quit rate 0.57 0.12    0.51 0.15    0.38 0.04    0.48 0.06
by real value added growth
'vat > 0 0.67 0.07    0.64 0.10    0.56 0.05    0.70 0.07
'vat < 0 0.61 0.13    0.58 0.15    0.42 0.05    0.60 0.06
'vat-1 > 0 0.64 0.08    0.66 0.13    0.56 0.05    0.73 0.06
'vat-1 < 0 0.54 0.12    0.56 0.10    0.48 0.05    0.58 0.07
'vat+'vat-1 > 0 0.67 0.03    0.66 0.05    0.58 0.05    0.70 0.06
'vat+'vat-1 < 0 0.57 0.14    0.56 0.14    0.44 0.05    0.55 0.07
'vat> sector mediant 0.67 0.09    0.67 0.11    0.63 0.05    0.77 0.07
'vat< sector mediant 0.63 0.13    0.63 0.13    0.50 0.05    0.64 0.07
by profits
3t > 0 0.62 0.10    0.61 0.06    0.66 0.06    0.54 0.05
3t < 0 0.53 0.09    0.54 0.07    0.48 0.06    0.39 0.05
3t-1 > 0 0.63 0.09    0.63 0.06    0.54 0.05    0.66 0.07
3t-1 < 0 0.52 0.12    0.53 0.14    0.36 0.05    0.49 0.06
by employment growth
'Lt > 0 0.68 0.11    0.67 0.10    0.58 0.05    0.70 0.07
'Lt < 0 0.55 0.12    0.52 0.10    0.41 0.05    0.55 0.06
'Lt-1 > 0 0.64 0.08    0.62 0.09    0.58 0.05    0.69 0.06
'Lt-1 < 0 0.60 0.12    0.55 0.17    0.48 0.05    0.61 0.07
'Lt+'Lt-1 > 0 0.68 0.02    0.65 0.09    0.56 0.05    0.74 0.06
'Lt+'Lt-1 < 0 0.54 0.10    0.53 0.13    0.44 0.05    0.56 0.07
by employment growth and turnover
low turnover & 'L<0 0.55 0.18    0.52 0.22    0.50 0.06    0.65 0.08
high turnover & 'L<0 0.61 0.05    0.60 0.07    0.41 0.05    0.52 0.06
Note: Averages for quit rate and volatility categories are based on estimates over 1996-2002. The entire sample includes
estimates for 1991-2002. Our baseline specification in Section 5.3 is restricted variance and unrestricted mean of 3
e.
6. Conclusion
This  paper  evaluates  the  extent  of  downward  nominal  and  real  wage  rigidity  in  Belgium  for  different
categories of workers, under different company characteristics and economic situations, using the recently
developed  IWFP  procedure.  The  analysis  is  based  on  an  administrative  data  set  on  individual  earnings
covering approximately one-third of employees in the private sector in Belgium over the period 1990-2002.
Our results show that Belgium  is characterised  by strong real wage rigidity and very low nominal wage
rigidity, which is  consistent with the Belgian wage formation system  of full indexation. Nominal rigidity is
essentially absent, except for cases in which it becomes binding, such as very low earnings that are close to
the minimum wage. This is mainly the case for younger workers with low wage levels. The finding of very low
nominal real rigidity points to almost no grease effects of inflation in Belgium. On the contrary, real rigidity will
translate inflation into nominal wage increases.
In this paper, we further highlight differences in the degree of rigidity across workers and firms. We explain
the  patterns  by  considering  both  the  general  predictions  of  labour  market  theories  and  specific  wage
formation institutions in Belgium. First, we found higher real wage rigidity for white-collar workers than for
blue-collar workers. Because white-collar workers are more difficult to replace and harder to monitor, firms
are less inclined to cut their wages. In addition, automatic wage increases are largely non-existent for blue-
collar workers in Belgium. Second, real rigidity decreases with age. Since the cost of job loss is higher for
older workers, they are less likely to quit their jobs or shirk, even if their earnings increases are below their
expected  bargaining  reference  point.  Furthermore,  the  automatic  tenure-related  and  age-related  wage
increases become less prominent with age. Third, DRWR decreases with earnings level, except for very low
earnings. As income grows, a larger fraction is attributable to extra wage compensation such as bonuses.
Very low earnings show a low degree of real rigidity, possibly because they correspond to more temporary
and precarious jobs, with lower bargaining power for real wage increases.
Fourth, downward real wage rigidity is more prevalent in small firms than in large firms. The latter often apply
a firm-level wage agreement with more variable wage components that enhance their flexibility. Fifth, our
results also suggest that firms with low quit rates are characterised by stronger real rigidity. Provided that
firms with low quit rates are those with high turnover costs, they have an incentive to avoid (real) wage cuts
in order to reduce (costly) quits.
Sixth, observed DRWR fluctuates with firms' economic conditions. Real wage rigidity is lower when the firm
faces  adverse  economic  conditions.  There  are  more  (real)  earnings  cuts  when  value  added  growth,
employment  growth  or  profits  are  negative.  The  effects  are  even  stronger  for  firms  with  low  turnover,
suggesting that wage cuts may substitute for employment cuts when firm’s situation deteriorates. Note that
although the degree of real rigidity declines for firms that have an incentive to cut wages, the absolute level
of real rigidity remains high in a cross-country comparison.33
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following a large increase in t, so that the current level can be considered as normal. Lastly, in order to take
into account sector-specific business cycle conditions, we consider value added growth relative to the sector
median. Whatever the indicator and measure of rigidity considered, DRWR is always lower in adverse times.











DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR      DRWR  DNWR
entire sample 0.59 0.19      0.61 0.15      0.49 0.05      0.62 0.06
by size
 25 employees 0.78 0.12    0.79 0.11    0.47 0.05    0.58 0.07
26-50 employees 0.70 0.12    0.70 0.09    0.52 0.05    0.61 0.06
51-100 employees 0.72 0.08    0.74 0.07    0.59 0.04    0.73 0.05
101-500 employees 0.62 0.02    0.59 0.07    0.50 0.05    0.65 0.06
>500 employees 0.44 0.21    0.41 0.23    0.41 0.05    0.54 0.07
by quit rate
very low or zero quit
rate 0.72 0.17    0.72 0.11    0.59 0.07    0.66 0.08
low quit rate 0.70 0.09    0.68 0.07    0.57 0.05    0.73 0.08
medium quit rate 0.70 0.07    0.71 0.06    0.52 0.05    0.62 0.06
high quit rate 0.57 0.12    0.51 0.15    0.38 0.04    0.48 0.06
by real value added growth
'vat > 0 0.67 0.07    0.64 0.10    0.56 0.05    0.70 0.07
'vat < 0 0.61 0.13    0.58 0.15    0.42 0.05    0.60 0.06
'vat-1 > 0 0.64 0.08    0.66 0.13    0.56 0.05    0.73 0.06
'vat-1 < 0 0.54 0.12    0.56 0.10    0.48 0.05    0.58 0.07
'vat+'vat-1 > 0 0.67 0.03    0.66 0.05    0.58 0.05    0.70 0.06
'vat+'vat-1 < 0 0.57 0.14    0.56 0.14    0.44 0.05    0.55 0.07
'vat> sector mediant 0.67 0.09    0.67 0.11    0.63 0.05    0.77 0.07
'vat< sector mediant 0.63 0.13    0.63 0.13    0.50 0.05    0.64 0.07
by profits
3t > 0 0.62 0.10    0.61 0.06    0.66 0.06    0.54 0.05
3t < 0 0.53 0.09    0.54 0.07    0.48 0.06    0.39 0.05
3t-1 > 0 0.63 0.09    0.63 0.06    0.54 0.05    0.66 0.07
3t-1 < 0 0.52 0.12    0.53 0.14    0.36 0.05    0.49 0.06
by employment growth
'Lt > 0 0.68 0.11    0.67 0.10    0.58 0.05    0.70 0.07
'Lt < 0 0.55 0.12    0.52 0.10    0.41 0.05    0.55 0.06
'Lt-1 > 0 0.64 0.08    0.62 0.09    0.58 0.05    0.69 0.06
'Lt-1 < 0 0.60 0.12    0.55 0.17    0.48 0.05    0.61 0.07
'Lt+'Lt-1 > 0 0.68 0.02    0.65 0.09    0.56 0.05    0.74 0.06
'Lt+'Lt-1 < 0 0.54 0.10    0.53 0.13    0.44 0.05    0.56 0.07
by employment growth and turnover
low turnover & 'L<0 0.55 0.18    0.52 0.22    0.50 0.06    0.65 0.08
high turnover & 'L<0 0.61 0.05    0.60 0.07    0.41 0.05    0.52 0.06
Note: Averages for quit rate and volatility categories are based on estimates over 1996-2002. The entire sample includes
estimates for 1991-2002. Our baseline specification in Section 5.3 is restricted variance and unrestricted mean of 3
e.
6. Conclusion
This  paper  evaluates  the  extent  of  downward  nominal  and  real  wage  rigidity  in  Belgium  for  different
categories of workers, under different company characteristics and economic situations, using the recently
developed  IWFP  procedure.  The  analysis  is  based  on  an  administrative  data  set  on  individual  earnings
covering approximately one-third of employees in the private sector in Belgium over the period 1990-2002.
Our results show that Belgium  is characterised  by strong real wage rigidity and very low nominal wage
rigidity, which is  consistent with the Belgian wage formation system  of full indexation. Nominal rigidity is
essentially absent, except for cases in which it becomes binding, such as very low earnings that are close to
the minimum wage. This is mainly the case for younger workers with low wage levels. The finding of very low
nominal real rigidity points to almost no grease effects of inflation in Belgium. On the contrary, real rigidity will
translate inflation into nominal wage increases.
In this paper, we further highlight differences in the degree of rigidity across workers and firms. We explain
the  patterns  by  considering  both  the  general  predictions  of  labour  market  theories  and  specific  wage
formation institutions in Belgium. First, we found higher real wage rigidity for white-collar workers than for
blue-collar workers. Because white-collar workers are more difficult to replace and harder to monitor, firms
are less inclined to cut their wages. In addition, automatic wage increases are largely non-existent for blue-
collar workers in Belgium. Second, real rigidity decreases with age. Since the cost of job loss is higher for
older workers, they are less likely to quit their jobs or shirk, even if their earnings increases are below their
expected  bargaining  reference  point.  Furthermore,  the  automatic  tenure-related  and  age-related  wage
increases become less prominent with age. Third, DRWR decreases with earnings level, except for very low
earnings. As income grows, a larger fraction is attributable to extra wage compensation such as bonuses.
Very low earnings show a low degree of real rigidity, possibly because they correspond to more temporary
and precarious jobs, with lower bargaining power for real wage increases.
Fourth, downward real wage rigidity is more prevalent in small firms than in large firms. The latter often apply
a firm-level wage agreement with more variable wage components that enhance their flexibility. Fifth, our
results also suggest that firms with low quit rates are characterised by stronger real rigidity. Provided that
firms with low quit rates are those with high turnover costs, they have an incentive to avoid (real) wage cuts
in order to reduce (costly) quits.
Sixth, observed DRWR fluctuates with firms' economic conditions. Real wage rigidity is lower when the firm
faces  adverse  economic  conditions.  There  are  more  (real)  earnings  cuts  when  value  added  growth,
employment  growth  or  profits  are  negative.  The  effects  are  even  stronger  for  firms  with  low  turnover,
suggesting that wage cuts may substitute for employment cuts when firm’s situation deteriorates. Note that
although the degree of real rigidity declines for firms that have an incentive to cut wages, the absolute level
of real rigidity remains high in a cross-country comparison.34
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The  results  are  in  line  with  the  predictions  of  the  shirking  model,  the  turnover  model  and  the  adverse
selection model applied to quits. Mixed evidence  was  found for the insider-outsider theory and the firm-
specific human capital model. The patterns found in the data contradict the predictions of the contract theory.
Our  results  are  robust  to  alternative  specifications  of  the  estimator,  as  well  as  to  alternative  simplified
measures of rigidity.
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Appendix
Our initial sample contains 32 percent of dependent employees from the private sector over the period 1990-
2002.  This  represents  over  21  million  observations  on  annual  individual  earnings.
40  Table  A1  below
describes our trimming procedure. We first exclude temporary and part-time workers. Permanent workers
are defined as those who work for the same employer for at least 11 months over two consecutive years. We
focus  on  the  manufacturing,  construction  and  commercial  services  sectors  (branches  D  to  K).  Next,  we
remove  inconsistent  observations
41  and  outliers  with  respect  to  age  and  earning  level,  as  described  in
Section 4. Finally, we consider only job stayers, i.e. workers who are employed by the same firm over two
consecutive  years.  Note  that  these  are  the  only ones  for  which  we  can  compute  the  wage  changes  by
employer. We end up with 20.9 percent of wage observations from the initial sample.
Table A1 - Trimming the sample
Av. number of workers in
Number of
earnings-year P.c. of
Belgium  data set  observations total
Total   3 240 339 1 035 073 21 359 155
excluding part-time workers and workers with more than
  1 month of leave per year (not paid by the firm)  584 077 8 316 224 38.9
excluding agriculture, fisheries and social services  430 610 6 027 217 28.2
excluding inconsistent observations  381 559 4 960 262 23.2
excluding observations where the individual worked less than
  310 days in 2 consecutive years  347 920 4 522 962 21.2
excluding workers based on their age and wages  343 005 4 459 064 20.9
excluding observations for which wage change cannot be calculated 3 417 527 16.0
(job movers, initial observations, discontinuity)
Our initial sample can be considered a random draw from the population of dependent employees from the
private sector in Belgium because it includes all employees born between the 5
th and the 15
th day of any
month.  Table  A2  documents  the  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  data  set  due  to  trimming  and  sample
restrictions. After dropping part-time workers from the initial sample, the percentage of blue-collar workers
increases  from  32.4  to  52.6  percent.  But  because  blue-collar  workers  are  more  likely  than  white-collar
workers to have more than 1 month of non-paid leave in a given year, their proportion drops to 42.3 percent.
The final data set contains substantially more men than women. We lose more observations for women than
for men in each step of trimming and sample selection: when excluding part-time workers, workers with more
than 1 month of leave per year and after excluding agriculture, fisheries and social services. In addition, we
lose a relatively large number of young workers when restricting our data set to full-time regular workers
(excluding student jobs, etc.).
40 Workers might earn more than one income per year (e.g. if they work for more than 1 employer).
41 In this step, we exclude workers who report more than one income from the same employer in a particular year and
individuals for whom there are not enough observations to calculate any wage change.37
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  1 month of leave per year (not paid by the firm)  584 077 8 316 224 38.9
excluding agriculture, fisheries and social services  430 610 6 027 217 28.2
excluding inconsistent observations  381 559 4 960 262 23.2
excluding observations where the individual worked less than
  310 days in 2 consecutive years  347 920 4 522 962 21.2
excluding workers based on their age and wages  343 005 4 459 064 20.9
excluding observations for which wage change cannot be calculated 3 417 527 16.0
(job movers, initial observations, discontinuity)
Our initial sample can be considered a random draw from the population of dependent employees from the
private sector in Belgium because it includes all employees born between the 5
th and the 15
th day of any
month.  Table  A2  documents  the  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  data  set  due  to  trimming  and  sample
restrictions. After dropping part-time workers from the initial sample, the percentage of blue-collar workers
increases  from  32.4  to  52.6  percent.  But  because  blue-collar  workers  are  more  likely  than  white-collar
workers to have more than 1 month of non-paid leave in a given year, their proportion drops to 42.3 percent.
The final data set contains substantially more men than women. We lose more observations for women than
for men in each step of trimming and sample selection: when excluding part-time workers, workers with more
than 1 month of leave per year and after excluding agriculture, fisheries and social services. In addition, we
lose a relatively large number of young workers when restricting our data set to full-time regular workers
(excluding student jobs, etc.).
40 Workers might earn more than one income per year (e.g. if they work for more than 1 employer).
41 In this step, we exclude workers who report more than one income from the same employer in a particular year and
individuals for whom there are not enough observations to calculate any wage change.38
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Table A2 - Impact of trimming and sample selection on the structure of the data set





Blue-collar workers 32.36 40.33
Men 52.73 75.52
Up to 24 years 18.76 10.29
25 to 34 years 35.51 35.84
35 to 44 years 26.06 28.95
45 to 54 years 15.14 19.84
55 years or more 4.53 5.08
Table A3 - Descriptive statistics on the distribution of gross earnings per day (in euro)
category observation mean  st. dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 pct
Total 4 459 064   90.3 43.44 52.8 62.7 77.8 103.9 143.4
Male 3 367 553   94.8 45.46 56.1 65.5 80.8 109.1 151.7 75.52
Female 1 091 511   76.7 32.97 46.3 54.6 68.6 89.0 115.5 24.48
Up to 24 years  458 871   61.5 15.44 44.3 50.6 59.0 69.3 81.2 10.29
25 to 34 years 1 598 172   79.7 29.78 51.8 60.5 72.6 90.9 115.8 35.84
35 to 44 years 1 291 072   96.7 44.86 57.0 67.3 83.6 112.1 153.5 28.95
45 to 54 years  884 489   107.7 51.59 60.5 72.4 93.3 127.6 174.6 19.84
55 years or more  226 460   119.9 61.55 61.6 75.5 102.9 146.9 202.3 5.08
w < P15  667 996   51.3 6.92 42.4 46.2 51.1 56.0 60.7 14.98
P15 < w < P35  891 609   63.6 7.13 54.4 58.4 63.3 68.5 73.4 20.00
P35 < w < P65 1 338 330   78.2 10.12 65.7 70.7 77.4 84.8 91.9 30.01
P65 < w < P85  892 068   105.1 14.96 87.2 94.0 103.3 114.5 125.6 20.01
w > P85  669 061   169.7 50.99 121.4 134.9 156.7 189.6 234.5 15.00
Blue-collar 1 798 460   71.8 19.58 51.2 58.9 68.5 80.6 96.0 40.33
White-collar 2 660 604   102.9 50.14 54.6 68.4 90.3 123.1 166.6 59.67
25 employees  550 261 74.7 32.31 49.0 56.8 66.9 80.9 107.1 18.42
26-50 employees  432 677 79.6 35.60 50.7 59.0 70.1 87.0 118.4 14.48
51-100 employees  313 366 87.0 40.72 54.0 62.8 75.2 96.9 134.3 10.49
101-500 employees  732 702 94.3 44.24 56.5 66.5 81.5 107.5 148.1 24.52
>500 employees  959 089 104.8 46.70 62.8 74.4 92.2 120.7 163.0 32.10
very low or zero quit
rate  123 610 94.9 41.22 59.4 69.0 83.9 108.1 142.2 6.50
low quit rate 1 219 324 106.3 49.68 63.7 74.0 91.7 122.3 167.8 64.15
medium quit rate  344 554 89.1 42.19 55.7 64.6 76.7 98.2 136.1 18.13
high quit rate  103 175 78.4 35.56 50.6 58.4 69.3 84.4 114.3 5.43
'vat > 0 1 619 958 91.1 42.74 54.4 64.3 78.8 103.7 142.2 56.18
'vat < 0 1 263 728 91.7 43.75 54.5 64.3 79.0 104.5 144.7 43.82
3t > 0 2 427 230 90.8 43.08 54.1 63.8 78.3 103.5 143.0 80.66
3t < 0  581 893 92.3 43.38 55.1 65.5 80.2 104.9 143.2 19.34
'Lt > 0 1 634 084 87.9 41.27 53.3 62.7 76.2 99.0 136.2 57.39
'Lt < 0 1 213 265 96.3 45.30 56.6 67.2 83.4 110.8 152.0 42.61
low turnover & 'L<0  560 191 110.2 51.14 64.7 76.3 96.3 127.6 173.7 30.44
high turnover & 'L<0  216 606 90.8 43.63 55.5 65.0 77.8 101.2 140.8 11.77
Note: "pct" gives the percentage of observations in a particular category. "p10" to "p90" refer to respective
percentiles of the earnings distribution.39
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Note: "pct" gives the percentage of observations in a particular category. "p10" to "p90" refer to respective
percentiles of the earnings distribution.40
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Table A4 - Descriptive statistics on the distribution of changes in earnings per day
category observation mean  st. dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 pct
Total 3 417 527 0.047 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12
Male 2 597 384 0.046 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 76.00
Female  820 143 0.052 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.13 24.00
Up to 24 years  253 367 0.067 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.16 7.414
25 to 34 years 1 200 765 0.057 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 35.14
35 to 44 years 1 030 555 0.043 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 30.16
45 to 54 years  734 532 0.035 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 21.50
55 years or more  198 308 0.032 0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10 5.80
w < P15  444 950 0.031 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10 13.02
P15 < w < P35  645 600 0.040 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.10 18.89
P35 < w < P65 1 031 043 0.045 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 30.17
P65 < w < P85  730 948 0.051 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14 21.39
w > P85  564 986 0.067 0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.18 16.53
Blue-collar 1 299 656 0.037 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 38.03
White-collar 2 117 871 0.054 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14 61.97
25 employees  418 956 0.042 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 18.07
26-50 employees  332 495 0.044 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 14.34
51-100 employees  241 594 0.047 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 10.42
101-500 employees  569 885 0.049 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 24.58
>500 employees  755 676 0.049 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 32.59
very low or zero quit
rate  106 701 0.039 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 6.75
low quit rate 1 044 894 0.048 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 66.10
medium quit rate  277 995 0.047 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.13 17.59
high quit rate  79 748 0.048 0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.14 5.04
'vat > 0 1 245 048 0.049 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 54.89
'vat < 0 1 023 033 0.044 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 45.11
3t > 0 1 877 217 0.047 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 80.40
3t < 0  457 620 0.045 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 19.60
'Lt > 0 1 233 064 0.049 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 55.06
'Lt < 0 1 006 270 0.045 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 44.94
low turnover & 'L<0  497 806 0.045 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 32.57
high turnover & 'L<0  183 864 0.044 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.12 12.03
Note: "pct" gives the percentage of observations in a particular category. "p10" to "p90" refer to respective
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Figure A1 - Measuring nominal rigidity
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empirical distribution effect of nominal rigidity
Note: Due to nominal rigidity, we observe fewer wage decreases (beige area in the histogram) and more wage
freezes (spike at zero). The simple measure of DNWR is the ratio of the height of the bin at zero and the area of
the empirical histogram at and below zero.
Figure A2 – Measuring real rigidity
Note: Solid line is the histogram of the observed wage change distribution. Dotted line shows
the part where the observed distribution deviates from the notional distribution under the
assumption of no real rigidity. Notional distribution is based on the Weibull distribution. ʌ
e is
the mean of the expected bargaining focal point, “med” stands for median, “L” is the area of
the observed distribution below ʌ
e, “P” is the area of the peak (as compared to the notional
distribution).
med ʌ
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